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Introduction: The Winding Course to War 
 The Japanese people have never been strangers to conflict. Centuries of internal strife led 
to the creation of a well-defined military class, the samurai, which persisted in idea if not in 
reality even after the abolition of their special rghts and the birth of a modern conscript army in 
the late 1800s. The samurai – and his successor on the battlefield, the Japanese soldier – was 
prized for his high martial skill, his prowess with the blade and in hand-to-hand combat, and his 
spiritual strength, which was able to overcome any dversary. He was not to fear death in combat, 
but rather to embrace it as the proper and fitting e d for a warrior. The practical result of this, in 
terms of Japanese military doctrine, was a fighting force with a tactical doctrine centered almost 
entirely around the infantry, prizing close quarters battle, and despising or shunning almost 
anything that detracted from these aspects of war – including the avoidance of death. 
 In other words, the basic nature of the Imperial Japanese Army by the time of the Asia-
Pacific War was hardly changed from that which had long served them so well. Victorious 
against Qing China in 1895 and again ten years later in the Russo-Japanese War, the discipline 
and fearlessness of the individual Japanese soldier had always carried their army to offensive 
success even against such formidably defended positions as Port Arthur. It was only natural that 
their decision makers would wish to ‘stay the course,’ but the dramatic technological 
developments of World War I – which Japan only marginally participated in – and the interwar 
changed the face of armed conflict forever. Well-armored tanks, long-range heavy artillery, and 
remarkable new aircraft provided support for infantry armed with grenades and heavy machine 
guns in large quantities, sniper rifles with high-quality optics, and hand-held automatic weapons. 
The Imperial Japanese Army failed to closely follow these developments and alter their tactics 
and doctrine sufficiently to integrate these changes with their order of battle, and consequently 
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they found themselves coming up short against the modern armies they faced off with, a fact first 
apparent in their border conflicts with the Soviet Union’s Red Army in 1938-39. The intangible 
which was to close the gap, that “spiritual superiority” remaining as a legacy of the samurai, 
granted the Japanese forces a well-deserved reputation as tenacious fighters, but ultimately 
proved insufficient as a reliable means of achieving victory. 
 After the 1931 Mukden Incident and the subsequent foundation of Japan’s puppet state in 
northeastern China, Manchukuo, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) found themselves face to 
face with their old enemy, Russia – now the Soviet Union. Border disputes soon turned hot, and 
a policy of limited war brought the forces of the Japanese Korea Army and Kwantung Army up 
against the Soviet Red Army on two separate battlegrounds in this theater: Changkufeng in 1938, 
and Nomonhan in 1939. Despite their groundbreaking importance and the serious implications of 
these engagements’ results for the future of the Japanese military and empire, neither received 
significant study or scrutiny at the time, largely clipsed by the events in Europe and the 
subsequent outbreak of world war. A New York Times editorial from the time remarked tellingly 
on this “strange war” in a “thoroughly out-of-the-way corner of the world where it cannot attract 
a great deal of attention.”1  
These conflicts remain relatively unknown in the popular consciousness even today, but 
historians finally began to study them in the late 1970s, in no small part due to their connection 
with the Soviet Union. Most prominent among these works are those by Alvin Coox, whose 
1977 study of the Changkufeng Incident entitled The Anatomy of a Small War is one of the only 
thorough scholarly works on this battle. Additionally, Coox’s 1985 magnum opus, Nomonhan: 
Japan Against Russia, 1939, brought this pivotal engagement into the spotligh, and his archival 
                                                
1 “A Strange War,” New York Times, July 20, 1939, 18, quoted in Edward J. Drea, Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet 
Tactical Combat (Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1981), ix. 
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research and interviews have formed the backbone of virtually every work on the incident 
published since. The first military analyses of these battles also came out around the same time, 
with the work of Edward Drea at the Combat Studies Institute at Leavenworth providing the 
foremost study of the tactical and organizational aspects of the individual maneuvers of the 
battles. With the exceptions of these authors, scholarship has been limited; these far-off battles 
fought as supposedly limited engagements have failed to capture the imaginations of writers, 
despite their tremendous significance as omens of what as to befall the Japanese in later 
combat. Although Coox, Drea, and others detail precisely how the Japanese lost each battle, as 
any military text must, none of them endeavor to fully consider why they were so frequently 
unable to achieve victory on the field, nor do they dwell on the fundamental problems with 
Japanese tactics in a modern war. This paper will exp ore this aspect by examining the details of 
battle presented in these histories and determine what they implied about the future efficacy of 
the Japanese Army’s tactical doctrine. In short, the ‘forgotten battles’ between Imperial Japan 
and Soviet Russia are not yet a closed book, and the etails that can be gleaned from their close 
study have meaningful implications for how the battlefield history of World War II in Asia 
should be written and remembered. 
 For this study I have relied heavily on the secondary sources of the authors mentioned 
above, especially the works by Alvin Coox. Coox’s work is based heavily in Japanese archival 
sources and interviews with veterans of the conflicts; very few of his sources are available 
outside of Japan, or even outside of their respectiv  archives, and so I am content to trust his 
interpretations of the battles from a Japanese perspective. Where I have used the available 
primary sources, I have endeavored to the greatest of my abilities in Japanese to read them 
correctly, but it is not unlikely that I have made mistakes. I also acknowledge the lack of a 
   
4 
Russian documentary perspective in this work, but many of the documents remain unavailable to 
the public and fewer yet have been translated or studied in any depth. The relative obscurity of 
these conflicts curses any author to a limited interpretation, but what is presented here is based 
on the most current available research in English. 
 Before embarking on a consideration of the IJA’s tactical mistakes at Changkufeng and 
Nomonhan, it is important to clearly establish what is meant by ‘tactics,’ since this is a word 
which has come into somewhat confusing usage in modern times alongside ‘strategy.’ 
Clausewitz provides the classical definitions: “tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the 
engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war [emphasis in original].”2 
In other words, a consideration of tactics is not concerned with whether the war was winnable, 
correct, or well-reasoned from the start; it is only i terested in the experiences in combat of the 
forces on the battlefield. Tactics is intimately relat d with low-level issues such as the 
specifications and capabilities of weaponry, the training and preferred maneuvers of soldiers, and 
the basic doctrines that form the foundation upon which a war is built. This is transformed into a 
“tactical doctrine,” thought of as “the officially approved methods for [the various units of an 
army]… to fight on the battlefield.”3 Contentions raised here, then, will not directly address the 
wisdom of the Japanese commanders in waging a war against the Red Army, nor will it consider 
the role of individual battles toward achieving Japanese goals. Instead, the focus is on the 
conduct of war at its most basic level: man versus man and all of those technological implements 
which extend the range of that primitive, deadly clash. This thesis will show how the Japanese 
neglect of technological advances in warfare at last made their dated tactics too costly to 
guarantee victory, thus irrecoverably dooming any greater strategy. 
                                                
2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1976), 128. 
3 Edward J. Drea, Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat (Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1981), ix. 
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Section I: A Natural Sphere of Influence 
 
To understand the origins and basic nature of the tactics used at Changkufeng and 
Nomonhan, it is necessary to consider the historical crucible in which the Japanese military was 
forged and tested. Meiji Japan (1868-1912) was a spectacularly ambitious nation. Programs of 
rapid and total modernization did away with the samurai class, introduced public education, 
reformed the military after European forms, and set Japan on the path to becoming a full-fledged 
industrial nation. The end of centuries of self-imposed isolation (the sakoku, or closed country, 
policy) also brought the newly reorganized state ino the international spotlight; after all, that 
policy was broken not by internal Japanese will, but by Commodore Perry’s show of force. One 
crucial consequence of this rude beginning was the imposition of unequal treaties onto Japan, in 
the same form as those which had turned China into a “quasi-colony” of the Western empires in 
the mid-1800s. These treaties, which ceded major parts of Chinese sovereignty to the European 
powers and the United States, hastened the fall of the Qing Dynasty into disorganization and 
disaster. Japan’s leaders had watched this transformation with great interest, and they were 
resolved to protect their reborn nation from the same humiliation. China’s steady 
dismemberment at the hands of the West provided a “powerful incentive” for Japan to aim high 
and move rapidly to secure its place as an equal among the great powers of the world.4 
Japan’s military reform was at the heart of this effort and the active part of the slogan of 
the times: “rich nation, strong army.” Incorporating the models of French and Prussian armies, as 
well as the assistance of advisors from those two sate , the Meiji government crafted a new 
conscript army to replace the inefficient and dated samurai warrior structure. Armed with rifles 
and bayonets, this peasant army was quickly and efficiently brought up to Western standards, 
                                                
4 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1998), 23. 
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and it would not be long before it proved its worth.  The rapid change in Japan did not occur 
without generating friction, and the samurai class, e pecially, was punished by the changes in 
land ownership and military structure being put in place. Tensions came to a head in 1877 with 
the Satsuma Rebellion led by the famous samurai Saigō Takamori, but their complete defeat by 
the national army brought the samurai era to its final end, opening the doors for further growth of 
the new conscripted military. 
The end of the samurai as a class, however, did not mean the end of bushidō, the 
Japanese way of the warrior. This ancient manner of battle, cultivated by the lore of samurai, 
emphasized spiritual strength and individual prowess in combat. Works such as the Hagakure, 
written during the Tokugawa period, came to symbolize this spirit of war, encouraging Japan’s 
warriors to cast off their fear of dying and fight only with bravery. It begins with the assertion 
that “the way of the samurai is found in death.”5 The power of this fearsome tradition was not 
lost upon the Meiji reformers, and it was deeply integrated into the Meiji armed forces alongside 
the new ideas of the European advisors. Admonitions were specifically issued to soldiers 
reminding them of the way of the warrior and marking them as heirs to that tradition.6 Hand-to-
hand combat with bayonets and maneuvers designed to bring Japanese soldiers into a situation 
where their blades could be used formed the backbone of their battlefield arts. 
Japan’s new army would have its first real war before the turn of the century. With the 
issue of unequal treaties at last resolved in 1894, border determination and regional security 
became the major concerns of the Meiji statesmen.7 Japan, as an island nation, had few troubles 
defining its main borders at that time; however, issues arose over some of the northern islands, 
which were disputed with Russia. A treaty in 1875 securing the Kurile Islands in exchange for 
                                                
5 Yamamoto Tsunetomo, Hagakure, trans. William Scott Wilson (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1992), 17.  
6 Edward J. Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945 (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2009), 48. 
7 R.H.P. Mason and J.G. Caiger, A History of Japan (Rutland, Vermont: Tuttle Publishing, 1997), 264. 
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Sakhalin cleared this hurdle, and also confirmed Hokkaidō as Japanese territory. Japan’s 
remaining regional concerns, then, were China and Korea. Though neither posed an active threat 
to Japan, the expansion of imperialism in the 1880s meant that foreign territorial ambitions could 
potentially extend well into those two East Asian states. The most succinct statement of this 
problem came from one of the German military advisors t  Japan, Major Jacob Meckel. In his 
words, Korea was “a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan; but what made Korea of strategic 
concern was not merely its proximity to Japan but its inability to defend itself against outsiders.”8 
If a foreign power were to assert itself in Korea (or China), it would represent an enormous 
national security threat to Japan. This was an issue that would have to be handled, either by 
securing Korea from foreign interference or by Japan cl iming it directly. 
An opportunity was created in 1875, when a Japanese warship was dispatched to the 
Korean Kanghwa Island, and the resulting incident allowed the Japanese government, through a 
series of diplomatic maneuvers, to enforce the Treaty of Kanghwa, which officially separated 
Korea from the Qing tributary system and opened it to Japanese influence. This move was not 
well-received by China, especially when Japan quickly moved troops onto the peninsula. The 
result was the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, in wh ch Japan’s new conscript army soundly 
and completely defeated the Qing forces on land and sea in virtually every encounter.9 The 
resolution of this conflict gave Japan its first true colonial possession in the form of Taiwan. 
Having proven itself in war, Japan ascended a rung on the international relations ladder, 
but not far enough to prevent the “triple interventio ,” when Russia, Germany, and France 
blocked them from securing concessions on the Asian m i land as a consequence of the 1894 
                                                
8 Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998), 49-50. 
9 Mason and Caiger, A History of Japan, 266-267. 
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war, leaving Japan “very resentful.”10 This move was the first leading to Japan’s next major war, 
and its first against a modern imperial power. Korea, now “nominally independent” and free of 
Chinese influence, turned into an ideological battlefie d. Elements in favor of progressive reform 
in Korea turned to Japan for political guidance (even as Japan began its economic exploitation of 
Korea), while conservative elements, now deprived of support from China, made entreaties to an 
interested Imperial Russia as a potential savior. Russia had been pursuing an aggressive policy of 
expansion in northeastern Asia throughout the late 1800s, including the construction of the 
Trans-Siberian Railway in the 1890s, and by 1900 they were the dominant power in northeastern 
China, the region known as Manchuria. When Russia attempted to use the Korean invitation to 
expand their control, Japan sharply checked them; ngotiations quickly gave way to war. 
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was a turning po t in the history of the Japanese 
empire, and the Russian as well. Through a series of hard-fought, bloody military actions, the 
Japanese ultimately gained ascendancy over the Russians, defeating them at sea, capturing the 
stronghold at Port Arthur, and ultimately securing victory at Mukden in central Manchuria.11 
These battles saw the maturation of Japanese military tactics, including the first examples of the 
‘human bullet’ attack, where charging soldiers would carry explosives to be detonated, along 
with themselves, once they reached the target.12 This would become central to their tactics at 
Changkufeng and Nomonhan. In his introduction to the war recollections of one of the soldiers 
who fought, Meiji statesman Ōkuma Shigenobu hails this development: “The soldiers vie with 
each other to offer themselves on the altar of their country; the spirit of self-sacrifice prevails to a 
                                                
10 Micheal T. Kikuoka, The Changkufeng Incident: A Study in Soviet-Japanese Conflict, 1938 (New York: 
University Press of America, 1988), 17. 
11 Mason and Caiger, A History of Japan, 268. 
12 For a harrowing, first-hand account of ‘human bullet’ attacks and the culture of war on the Japanese side during 
the Russo-Japanese War, see Sakurai Tadayoshi, Human Bullets, trans. Masujiro Honda and Alice M. Bacon 
(Tokyo: Teibi, 1907). 
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marked degree. This is the true characteristic of the race of Yamato. […] Even the lowest of 
soldiers fought in battle-fields with unflinching courage, and faced death as if it were going 
home. […] Their display of the true spirit of the Japanese Samurai is radically different from the 
behavior of men who appear on the fighting line with only the prospect of decorations and 
money before their eyes [the Russian army].”13  
The defeat of Russia at last brought Japan into the in ernational community of Great 
Powers, with the de facto recognition of Japan’s “natural sphere of influence in northeast Asia” 
and the expansion of its empire to include Korea (mde a protectorate after the war and 
ultimately annexed in 1910).14 At last, the resources of Manchuria were opened to Japanese 
expansion. In Russia, public discontent over defeat in the war, as well as a dramatic loss in 
international prestige, fanned the flames of the quickening revolution. Russia’s military, reborn 
in the Soviet Union, would not forget the ignominy of their defeat in 1905 – and Japan knew it. 
These two powers would meet on the battlefields of northeast Asia again before the century was 
half-past. 
Section II: Building Manchuria 
 Japanese military planners had aspired to have a foothold in Manchuria as early as the 
1880s, when the strategic issue of Korea first began to be considered. After all, if securing Korea 
was necessary to protect Japan, then it would also be essential to take the Liaodong Peninsula in 
order to secure Korea. When this region was seized as part of the end of the Russo-Japanese War, 
it enabled Japan to begin extending their empire into Manchuria at last. Japan did not have full 
reign over Manchuria, however; the area was still nominally under the control of China, and 
                                                
13 Ōkuma Shigenobu, Introduction to Human Bullets by Sakurai Tadayoshi, trans. Masujiro Honda and Alice M. 
Bacon (Tokyo: Teibi, 1907), x-xi. 
14 Mason and Caiger, A History of Japan, 269 
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Russia had obtained its territories there on the basis of leases. These leases were all transferred to 
Japan as part of the peace, including rights to the Liaodong Peninsula (referred to as the 
Kwantung Leased Territory), the southern branch of Russia’s Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), 
and the railway zone, a corridor that followed the track and included all towns along it.15 Japan 
began to expand its influence in the area with a combination of diplomacy and bribery in China 
after 1905. These efforts were given a great boost by World War I; the aversion of European 
eyes from Asia enabled the Japanese to force an exte sion of their rights in the northeast from 
China as part of the Twenty-One Demands, and Japan’s e rlier alliance with Britain allowed it to 
seize German holdings on the Shandong Peninsula during the course of the war. Piece by piece, 
Japan expanded its empire, and their endeavors on the continent would soon create major 
strategic problems which would demand tactical soluti ns. 
 The wide territories Japan now commanded in northeast Asia needed both control and 
security. For this purpose, the Japanese government established the new post of governor-general 
in 1905-06, which cooperated with the Mantetsu railw y corporation to govern the area.16 A 
significant military presence was also built-up in the region, since it was thought not only 
generally essential to the defense of Korea and, by extension, Japan itself, but specifically 
because the Imperial Japanese Army feared a revenge attack in the wake of Russo-Japanese War. 
This garrison force, which would ultimately become known as the Kwantung Army, would be 
the major actor in the events of the region, and the key to the conflicts to come. 
 The Kwantung garrison was, from its beginning, an active and ambitious force in 
Manchuria. It had a number of important roles to play in the region. By 1907, there was already a 
                                                
15 Young, Japan’s Total Empire, 24-25. 
16 For more information on Mantetsu and its role in the Japanese imperial and military developments in northeast 
Asia, see Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998). 
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significant and growing Japanese civilian population in Manchuria of around 38,000, and by 
1910 62,000 Japanese had migrated to the area.17 Bandits, demobilized Chinese soldiers resentful 
of the Japanese, and other “lawless elements” threaten d this population, especially in the 
railway corridors and borders, where they could easily e cape from the narrow area controlled by 
Japan. Defense of this civilian population was one f the Kwantung garrison’s first roles. The 
Japanese High Command’s major concern was far graver than bandits, however. Expectations of 
a Russian revenge attack loomed, and by 1907 the Russians were clearly identified as Japan’s 
“primary hypothetical enemy” in the first Imperial National Defense Policy.18 In order to protect 
against this threat, a sizeable force was needed, especially because planners called for an 
offensive policy in the event of war – an early coneptualization of the modern idea of ‘pre-
emptive warfare.’ The force that resulted from this strategy was reorganized in 1919 as the 
Kwantung Army, an administrative grouping including at its inception one core division and six 
independent battalions of railway guards.19 
 Yet none of these facts make the Kwantung Army stand out in any way. What made this 
force such an exceptional one was its willingness to meddle directly in local affairs, often with 
serious bloodshed, without the supervision or approval f the officials in Tokyo or even those in 
the higher echelons of the army, a type of “extracuri lar zealotry” that became a major 
problem for the Japanese government.20 Though often justified on the basis of security concerns, 
many of these operations were directed toward ending Chinese control of Manchuria. They were 
largely carried out by junior officers, “cocky and conceited because of their youth and supposed 
powers of execution,” who questioned the slow pace t k n by their seniors and insisted on 
                                                
17 Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 3. 
18 Coox, Nomonhan, 3. 
19 Alvin D. Coox, “The Kwantung Army Dimension,” in The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937, ed. 
Peter Duus et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 400. 
20 Coox, “Kwantung Army,” 400-401. 
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immediate action to achieve what they thought should be the goals of Japan.21 Furthermore, 
many of them shared a belief that “the War Ministry and General Staff in Tokyo did not fully 
realize the dangers posed by the Soviet Union” to Japanese interests.22 One of the first definitive 
acts of this brand was the assassination of the warlord Zhang Zuolin, whose death was hoped to 
provide an opportunity for Japan to claim all of Manchuria and secure it against the Soviets, but 
whose son successfully succeeded him. The next evenwould not be so inconsequential, 
however. The Mukden Incident, also known as the Manchurian Incident, of 1931 was better 
planned, more thoroughly organized within the army, and came at a time of heightened military 
sympathy in Japan. After staging an attack by Chinese soldiers on a Japanese railway, the 
Kwantung Army forces responsible immediately launched an invasion of a nearby Chinese 
barracks, overrunning it with minimal resistance. The operation snowballed from there, quickly 
leading to the occupation of the city of Mukden on the next day and the continuation of military 
operations against Chinese forces in northeast Asia. Presenting them with a series of faits 
accomplis, within five months the entire Japanese High Command had been dragged, with some 
resistance, into the “conquest of all Manchuria” by the Kwantung Army.23 The home 
government, though not approving of the action, wasunwilling to give up this territory; however, 
it would not be internationally acceptable to simply annex it. In order to resolve this issue, the 
Kwantung Army plotters made agreements with powerful Chinese figures in the region, created a 
false grassroots movement for Manchurian independence, and promptly declared an independent 
state known as Manchukuo, under a façade of leadership by the last Qing emperor, Pu Yi.24 The 
                                                
21 Coox, Nomonhan, 19. 
22 Drea, Nomonhan, 12. 
23 Coox, Nomonhan, 40. 
24 Young, Japan’s Total Empire, 40. 
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Japanese promptly recognized and allied itself withthis puppet government, securing effective 
direct control of the entire Manchurian region. 
 Manchukuo quickly took on the role of a “lifeline” which would provide the Japanese 
nation with everything it desired – most importantly, land and mineral resources.25 The promise 
of a new frontier and an escape from old ways brought an entire generation of civic planners, 
architects, engineers, policymakers, and scholars to the region, where they dreamed of creating a 
new kind of empire that would resolve the tensions between China and Japan.26 In 1936, to 
follow this trial wave, the Japanese government launched a colonization program aimed at 
sending one million farm families to Manchukuo to develop the land over the course of twenty 
years, ultimately sending 300,000 by 1945.27 Propaganda programs were launched at home, 
exhorting young Japanese people to travel to this new frontier and further open Japan’s lifeline. 
Manchukuo and its resources were to become the industrial heart of Japan, an essential and 
inseparable part of its empire in Asia. 
To achieve this grand vision, Kwantung Army officers determined themselves to be “the 
best kind of civilizers and empire builders,” and so took the lead in the government and 
development of the area together with the business support of Mantetsu.28 They launched an 
authoritarian consolidation of Japan’s economic situat on in the region, aiming to shut out any 
foreign powers before they could develop a presence. I  order to fully carry out this policy and 
develop the puppet state to meet Japanese needs, security concerns in the region had to be 
addressed – after all, the state was born out of the chaos of warlord rule in China, and had hardly 
                                                
25 Young, Japan’s Total Empire, 88. 
26 Young, Japan’s Total Empire, 241. 
27 Young, Japan’s Total Empire, 307. 
28 Coox, “Kwantung Army,” 409. 
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escaped it. Kwantung Army staff identified three “actual or potential threats” to nation-building: 
domestic Manchurian bandits, Nationalist China, and Soviet Russia.29  
The first of these was of more concern than one might expect. The railway corridors were 
easy targets for attack prior to 1931, and their security was not suddenly improved by the 
assumption of Japanese control over the region. “Professional brigands,” smugglers, Nationalists, 
Communists, former soldiers, and desperate farmers w e all represented in this class of enemy, 
which totaled as many as 360,000 men by autumn of 1932. To resolve this threat, the Japanese 
lead the organization of the Manchukuoan Army, a colonial force initially drawn from the 
unreliable reserves of the former Manchurian warlords and the brigands themselves. Training by 
the Japanese officers, however, soon made them into an effective fighting corps, which operated 
in significant numbers alongside Kwantung Army units to suppress raids and eliminate bandit 
groups, whose numbers were reduced to only about 7,300 by 1938.30 
Of greater concern was China. Ostensibly to guarantee the security of Manchukuo, 
Kwantung Army forces launched a number of offensive south in continuation of the operations 
which began with the Manchurian Incident. Their first major strike was into Jehol province in 
opposition to about 240,000 Chinese soldiers in early 1933. By April, Japanese troops passed the 
Great Wall and extended operations into North China, asserting continued “provocation” and 
raiding by Chinese units. In order to avoid the overrun of Beijing, local commanders signed a 
truce with the Japanese, guaranteeing the demilitariza ion of 13,000 square kilometers between 
Manchuria and Beijing in exchange for Japanese withdrawal behind the Great Wall; a Japanese-
friendly police force would secure the buffer zone.31 Similar operations continued until the 
outbreak of full-scale war between Japan and China in 1937. These early conflicts were mainly 
                                                
29 Coox, “Kwantung Army,” 412. 
30 Coox, Nomonhan, 67. 
31 Coox, Nomonhan,  67-68. 
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aimed at guaranteeing security on the southern flank in the event of a Soviet invasion of 
Manchukuo; the fractured forces of the Chinese mainland could scarcely mount an effective 
resistance against the Japanese, let alone threaten M nchukuo on their own.32 
 The so-called “Northern Problem” with the Soviet Union was the greatest of the 
Kwantung Army’s concerns. Conscious of an essentially p ssive policy by the Soviet 
government on Japanese actions in the region, the Kwantung Army sought to avoid any 
unnecessary provocations as part of the Manchurian Incident in 1931. Russian railway lines were 
crossed carefully and without damage, and the area between Harbin and Changchun, an 
influential part of the Russian-owned Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), was completely avoided. 
Despite these efforts, the Soviets were still unnerved by Japanese actions, and moved much of 
their rolling stock away from the area while building troop strength along the border. Any 
consideration of action by Russian forces to assist the Chinese Nationalists, however, was 
quickly quashed by Stalin himself.33 In any case, Soviet troop strength in the region was paltry, 
only about 55,000 men with a few tanks and planes. This weakness soon proved too risky when 
Japanese operations began to push past their accepted ‘na ural sphere of influence’ and into the 
Soviet-dominated parts of northeastern China, specifically with the move on Qiqihar in 
November of 1931. By 1932 the Kwantung Army had swept past Hailar and was approaching the 
border of Outer Mongolia, and at the end of that yer the Soviet Union commenced the 
reinforcement of the border region “in earnest”; by 1933 the Red Army had eight rifle divisions, 
a full cavalry division and a full cavalry brigade, 200 combat aircraft, and 250 armored vehicles 
arrayed against Japan.34 Along with this force building, the Soviets began to construct defensive 
emplacements and fortifications, including wooden barricades and ferroconcrete pillboxes near 
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the Amur River, as well as an additional fortification line protecting the Trans-Siberian rail lines. 
By 1933 construction crews had begun the development of air fields, roads, and bridges in all 
areas with an additional 150 aircraft and 100 armored vehicles in support.35 All of these efforts, 
however, were basically defensive; they did not place the Soviet forces in any position to launch 
an attack against Manchukuo. What Japanese planners expected instead was a coordinated 
campaign of psychological warfare and guerilla support, ossibly culminating in the 
establishment of an offensive policy once Stalin’s Fir t Five-Year Plan had concluded at home – 
placing the start of Soviet aggression around 1936.36 Kwantung Army strategists began to 
consider the possibility of a “preventative war,” and ultranationalist hawks in influential 
government positions, such as Japanese War Minister Araki Sadao, made a number of statements 
suggesting Japan’s intent to wage war against Russia a econd time.37 Regardless of their 
defensive intentions, the Soviets had created a security problem for Manchukuo, and so the IJA 
began to rattle its sabers, intensifying the situation. 
The Soviet Union could not ignore such aggressive overtures, and so military build-up 
continued directly alongside ongoing efforts at diplomacy, creating a “vicious circle” of 
reinforcement.38 In 1934 Soviet aircraft strength along the border was increased to 500, including 
a number of high-capacity bombers which could reach Tokyo and Osaka in around six hours 
with a load of over 5,000 pounds of bombs, and this strength was nearly doubled by 1935, 
reaching an estimated 950 planes.39 All other units increased at a similar pace, with the Japanese 
estimating that by the conclusion of 1935 a total of 240,000 Soviet soldiers were “eyeball to 
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eyeball” with Japanese forces across the border.40 The situation came to a sudden halt in the 
middle of that year, however, with two crucial developments. First, the Soviet Union concluded 
the sale of the CER – their key security concern in Manchuria proper – to the Japanese, for 170 
million Manchukuoan yen, a process which had begun in 1931. This sale eased tensions 
considerably, as some members of the Kwantung Army had suggested that purchase was 
unnecessary and had planned to simply seize the railway as a part of creating Manchukuo.41 Such 
a move could have potentially set off a major military confrontation, and so the peaceable 
transfer of the railway was good news for Soviet-Japanese relations in the region. The second 
development was Hitler’s announcement in March 1935 of his intent to rearm Germany. This 
move divided Soviet attention and was also certain to delay their efforts at troop build-up since 
they would now need to protect their Western front as well. Despite the positive contributions of 
the First Five-Year Plan to their military preparedn ss, it would be quite some time before they 
could effectively plan to wage simultaneous, independent operations against both Germany and 
Japan. 1936 would pass quietly without an offensive on ither side of the Amur, as both sides 
continued to strengthen their positions for what was becoming an inevitable confrontation. 
Nevertheless, the Kwantung Army could not wait around complacently in the face of 
such a build-up at their backdoor. Defensive preparations had begun on their side as soon as the 
offensive maneuvers of 1931 and 1932 had settled down, particularly with the expansion of the 
internal railways. The Japanese had long considered Manchuria’s railways the key elements of 
its defense; total control of them was essential to llowing quick troop movement to any area of 
the broad Manchurian frontier, and by the end of 1935 the track length had increased by 2,600 
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kilometers to a total of 8,700.42 New road networks, military warehouses, and heavy industrial 
plants also supplemented the Kwantung war machine. Th se developments, however, could not 
erase what Japanese intelligence planners were incrasingly becoming aware of via espionage 
operations: the Soviet forces greatly outnumbered th ir own. In 1935, the Kwantung Army had a 
military manpower of only 164,100 people, almost 76,000 less than the Red Army in the area. 
They had only about 20% of the Soviets’ strength in airpower and tanks, and no organized 
cavalry divisions to speak of.43 Officers looked to the homeland for more armaments a d 
equipment, but Japan could hardly compete with Soviet Russia, where “the Russians devoted 
themselves preponderantly to the build-up of military industry, thereby depressing living 
standards to a level so appalling that it would have provoked revolution in Japan” in the opinion 
of one Japanese intelligence expert.44  
Since the Soviets seemed to have a stronger hand, even with new troubles brewing in 
Germany, the Japanese solution was to bluff. This approach manifested in a systematic campaign 
of underestimation of their enemies capabilities in pite of continuing intelligence to the contrary. 
Major General Honma Masaharu, who would become the chief of the Army Intelligence Bureau 
in 1937, told the Japanese press that the Stalinist purges of army leaders had pushed the Russian 
army to very near “disintegration and destruction.”45 This disbelief was bolstered by a long-
standing contempt among Japanese military men for Russian capabilities, based on the battles of 
the Russo-Japanese War as well as the 1918 Siberian Intervention against the Bolsheviks. For the 
most part, Japanese soldiers equated modern Russian forces with the badly equipped and largely 
untrained Chinese soldiers that they had fought out of Manchukuo and who had been Japan’s 
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most frequent opponent since the first World War. Those few voices who spoke out against this 
point of view, such as Giga Tetsuji and Tanaka Ryūkichi, were effectively ignored. 46  
Privately, the Japanese were well aware of their numerical inferiority and shortage of 
equipment, but it was not considered to be an issue. Plans were made to win by encirclement 
against a force three times greater than what the Kwantung Army could muster in the theater, 
revealing how seriously even internal plans underestimated the capability of individual Soviet 
soldiers and their officers. At the core of such an operation would be the traditional combat 
tactics of the Kwantung Army and indeed of the entir  Imperial Japanese Army – envelopment 
of enemy forces based on superior speed and battlefield movements, detouring of enemy 
reinforcements, and finally victory secured through traditional, bloody hand-to-hand combat 
against an isolated foe.47 The 1928 Field Service Regulations, still in issue for the Kwantung 
Army at that time, had removed every reference to “surrender,” “retreat,” and “defense,” erasing 
them as sanctioned maneuvers.48 Additionally, “no Japanese field army had higher morale or 
motivation” than the Kwantung Army, which was always ready for hostilities from the north.49 It 
was not, then, that Japanese intelligence had no appreciation for Soviet numbers, but simply that 
they believed that their fearlessness, superior sp it de corps, and close combat could enable 
them to smash the Soviet “hordes” in spite of the total number of troops in theater. This was not 
necessarily an unreasoned plan either, since additional Soviet reinforcements could arrive from 
the west in a matter of months which would quickly devastate any chance of a Japanese victory 
through a slow offensive. Only a rapid series of decisive, enveloping strikes could push deeply 
enough into Soviet territory to bring the situation t  the best the Japanese could hope for – an 
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endurance-based fight with an unclear resolution down the line, with the goal of securing ground 
in Siberia to draw combat away from Manchukuo. It was a risky strategy to make war plans from, 
but the Kwantung Army was no stranger to chance. 
Section III: Battle of Lake Khasan/Chōkohō Jiken (Changkufeng Incident) 
 A serious diplomatic issue lay at the heart of all the military preparations being made. 
Though efforts had begun as early as 1924 to clearly determine the border between Chinese 
Manchuria and Soviet territory, the weak Chinese state and the strong Russian sphere of 
influence effectively intervened to prevent any sharp lines from ever being drawn. What the 
Japanese had claimed as Manchukuo, then, was an area with “ambiguous and indefinite” borders, 
regularly expanding in the south and virtually undemarcated in the north, northwest, and 
northeast.50 For example, on the eastern frontier only thirty-five physical border markers had 
originally existed for a 632 kilometer border, and twelve of those had disappeared.51 
Consequently, the reality of borders came in the form f military power, as both sides launched 
programs of fortification, reinforcement, and espionage. Japanese sources report that between 
1932 and 1934, 152 small scale disputes occurred, often in the form of Russian abduction of 
natives, intelligence-gathering operations, or interfer nce with the mail. Several violations of 
Japanese airspace, minor attacks on shipping, and weapons fire across the border were also 
recorded.52 The frequency of such violations, and the intensity of them, continued to increase as 
the border issue remained unresolved. An armed dispute over a small island on the Amur River 
led to the sinking of a Soviet gunboat in 1937, but diplomacy (and unfinished military 
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preparations on both sides) narrowly carried the day, averting a major conflict.53 That same year, 
the Japanese government announced a “Five-Year Plan For the Production of War Materials” in 
direct response to the developments in the region.54 The unstable peace between the two states 
was only further shaken as time went on and border negotiations failed to reach any agreement. 
 Matters would at last erupt into war in 1938 as part of the Chōkohō Jiken/Battle of Lake 
Khasan, centered over a hill called Changkufeng. This “small war,” as Alvin Coox has called it, 
did not directly involve the Kwantung Army, but rather a neighboring force, the IJA’s Korea 
Army, the Japanese garrison force of colonial Korean. Chōkohō was a significant step up in 
seriousness from any of conflicts that had marked th  border conflicts, involving not only 
significant numbers of troops but also armor and air support as part of its operations.55 The 
battlefield was a salient of Manchuria at the junction of the borders of northeastern Korea, 
southeast Manchukuo, and the Soviet Maritime Province. Like all of the frontier, it was poorly 
demarcated, but Changkufeng was an important high ground for the defense of the local region.56 
This area, despite being more a part of Manchukuo than of Korea, was guarded by the Japanese 
garrison at Hunchun, part of the Korea Army. Neverth less, the Kwantung Army was intimately 
involved in the proceedings of the fighting, and the Chōkohō Incident offered them a variety of 
lessons through fire in terms of the implications of m dern armor, artillery, and fundamental 
Soviet capability. It also offered some erroneous conclusions, most importantly that Soviet 
troops were dramatically inferior to the Japanese and so could not possibly succeed in a ‘real 
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fight’ without the strictures of limited war. Consequently, it is essential that this prelude to the 
larger battle at Nomonhan be examined. 
 The conflict began when the Kwantung Army intercepted a Soviet radio communication 
on July 6, 1938. A Soviet commanding officer instruc ed the forces headquartered at Khabarovsk 
to “secure previously unoccupied high ground west of Lake Khasan” with the deployment of at 
least one platoon and construction of entrenchments and entanglements beginning as soon as 
possible.57 Terrain advantages from control of this area would offer the Russians a commanding 
view of the Korean port of Najin. The Kwantung Army intelligence branch wired the decoded 
order to the Korea Army headquarters at once, who observed on that same day the presence of 
Soviet horsemen performing reconnaissance operations on the hill. The Japanese, anticipating 
the imminent expansion of operations against China, decided to adopt a ‘wait-and-see’ posture 
on the matter.58 About one week later, an additional forty mounted soldiers arrived at 
Changkufeng and began an expansion of the outpost, reparing gun emplacements, observation 
points, and communications facilities, all supported by a logistical network established across 
Lake Khasan; their disposition made it clear that te Soviets intended a “stay of indefinite 
duration.”59 The Japanese 19th Division, commanded by Lieutenan Ge eral Suetaka Kamezō of 
the Korea Army, moved immediately to reinforce the insufficient border guard in the area, but 
did not launch operations against the Soviets, awaiting further instructions from High Command. 
The Kwantung Army, sensing a hint of restraint in the hearts of the Korea Army leaders, quickly 
moved to provide what one Korea Army officer referred to as a “boot in the ass” – a harshly 
phrased warning that if the garrison forces did not act, the Kwantung Army would be left with no 
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choice but to handle matters in the region on their own, further detracting from the already low 
prestige of the Korea Army.60 Stirred by this intra-service rivalry and anxious to avoid appearing 
meek, the garrison units immediately began to make plans for force reconnaissance operations 
against the Soviet positions, with the aim of conducting a “limited” operation without pursuit 
into accepted Soviet territory.61 However, this minor border crossing incident near an 
insignificant hill would escalate suddenly, well beyond what either side anticipated. 
 The battles at Changkufeng would be a textbook example of a limited war. The Japanese 
19th Division was an excellent fighting force, well trained and disciplined, and their commander, 
Suetaka, was eager for a fight – it was a perfect situation to unleash him. The battle plan called 
for the use of only the 19th Division operating without tank or air support in a single-minded 
effort to resume control of Changkufeng. Not a single Japanese boot would cross into accepted 
Soviet territory.62 If the Soviets were to bring their full regional might to bear on this diminutive 
opponent, they would certainly crush it with ease, but the IJA was confident that they would not 
expand the conflict in the face of a significant poential turnaround via a Japanese commitment 
of the Kwantung Army to the area. Japanese commanders believed that Stalin would not be 
willing to waste resources in an area where the Sino-Japanese conflict had already shown the 
“enormous human resources and artillery shells consumed in the prolonged fighting,” an ironic 
statement considering the outcome.63 
The situation quickly began to escalate. On July 15, a Japanese patrol near Hill 52, to the 
southeast of Changkufeng, came under fire from Soviet small arms, and was forced to retreat 
with one dead man left behind. The Japanese saw in this an ambush set against them in their own 
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territory; the Soviets saw a Japanese incursion by thirt  meters across their border. Official 
protests lodged by Japan’s ambassador to the Soviet Un on, Shigemitsu Mamoru, were met with 
a cold Soviet resolve to retain their position, andthe death of a Japanese soldier compounded the 
growing anger of the 19th Division. By July 18, Soviet strength near Changkufeng totaled 
around 130 men along with several heavy guns, and the Japanese forces in the region were told 
to make one more effort at negotiation. An envoy was dispatched to the Soviet forces with a 
message informing them that the encroachment on Chagkufeng would be considered an 
“invasion” and that “necessary action… will be taken… with firm determination” by the 19th 
Division if they did not leave.64 Simultaneously, the Japanese Foreign Office releasd  
statement indicating that “responsibility for all possible complications… shall be laid on the 
Soviet government.”65 The Japanese envoy was held for several days with no response, until they 
were released, blindfolded, on July 26, as trespassers into Soviet territory.66 
An additional Soviet intrusion on July 29 – even by their own border reckoning – near 
Shachaofeng, 1.6 kilometers north of Changkufeng, demanded a Japanese response.67 A platoon 
was dispatched to immediately evict the Soviets. The Japanese were, according to reports, fired 
on first, but continued to advance until they received casualties, at which point they opened fire 
and engaged the enemy. The five or six Soviets wereoutnumbered but had available a light 
machine gun, with which they could check the Japanese offensive. However, a break in fire 
allowed a Japanese charge to succeed, and in close combat they killed eight Soviet soldiers. 
Soviet horsemen moved from near Lake Khasan to counterattack, but were stopped by light 
mortar fire from the platoon. The conflict quickly escalated as Japanese reinforcements arrived to 
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face Soviet forces now streaming in from the northwest, and one Japanese squad moved against 
the fortifications on Changkufeng, which had opened up with machine gun fire. A Soviet 
counterattack that same day was supported with tanks, and artillery fire began to fall from behind 
the hill, prompting further Japanese reinforcement.68 The battle was on, but the Japanese 
resolved to finish it with a single hammer blow to drive back the enemy and discourage them 
from risking the border ever again. 
The next Japanese move would demonstrate an operational tactic that came to define 
their preferred engagement style: the close-combat night attack, where Japanese forces would 
move quickly under the cover of darkness, breach the enemy defenses without firing a shot, then 
engage in a pitched close-quarters battle within the enemy fortification. On July 30, daytime 
troop movements were restricted, and plans were made for a major night attack under the 
leadership of Sato Kotoku. The Soviet positions had all been rapidly reinforced, and the Japanese 
estimated that they had at least a battalion and a half in the area as well as twenty tanks, artillery, 
and three hundred soldiers now emplaced on Changkufeng itself. 69 To strike a decisive blow 
against the Soviets, the high ground would have to be taken to support the earlier Japanese 
operations in Shachaofeng. The 1st Battalion, lead by Sato, would attack from the south, 
unsupported by artillery fire, which would be reserved until the offensives at daybreak. In any 
case, only two heavy guns were in position, since “fir power was considered of secondary 
importance in close combat and because there were sho tages of artillery.”70 Japanese soldiers 
were instructed to charge without firing, in order to quickly enter into hand-to-hand combat 
range: “The key to success in a night assault lies in the absolute prohibition of firing by our side. 
Great success can be expected from… a charge. Moreover, human beings are bestowed with life 
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for the first time after they die.”71 This invocation of the ‘way of the warrior’ to justify a costly 
offensive would not be the last. 
The attack launched smoothly under the cover of darkness, opening two breaches in the 
Soviet lines before being detected by guard dogs and revealed by flares at 12:10 AM. The 
Changkufeng defenders, taken by surprise, were unable to immediately place accurate fire on the 
Japanese offensive group, which was forbidden to return fire and betray its position. At 2:15 AM 
the wires were cleared and bayonets were fixed in preparation for the main thrust toward the 
Soviet emplacements. By 2:30 the Soviets had organized their defensive fire into a cacophony of 
rifles, light and heavy machine gun fire, grenades, tank cannon, and emplacement guns, but still 
the Japanese did not fire a single shot, using only sword and bayonet.72 The realization that an 
additional line of entanglement was ahead, however, slowed the Japanese advance as withering 
machine gun fire pinned them down; a “do or die” forced clearing team, not unlike those used 
extensively at Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War, breached the wire while sustaining heavy 
casualties. Confusion had set in among the Japanese troops by this point, and the multiple prongs 
of the assault were in disarray, some having been pinned down by Soviet tank fire, and others 
pelted with grenades and machine gun bullets.73  A Japanese regimental report on the attack 
released the next day would disdainfully note that e Soviets “relied exclusively on fire power; 
there was no instance of a brave enemy charge employing cold steel.”74 Ironically, only twenty 
meters from the Russian positions, the Japanese were praying for a firepower miracle of their 
own as they began to attempt to snipe Soviet gunners and grenadiers. At last, machine gun fire 
opened up from the Japanese side after a charge into position by the machine gun company, 
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disabling one of the Soviet tanks with a volley of armor-piercing rounds – all of the AP rounds 
they had been equipped with.75 Finally able to push over the crest of Changkufeng, the Japanese 
heard Russian calls of “hurrah” from positions below them on the other side of the hill. Though 
they expected a charge, this was actually the signal for  Soviet retreat, and the encouraged 
Japanese charged down the slope, cutting down Soviet soldiers with sword and bayonet. At 5:15 
AM a green star-shell flare was launched and the Japanese flag was hoisted over Changkufeng’s 
heights.76 
Similar Japanese offensives succeeded elsewhere at dawn, securing Hill 52, which was 
essential to the defense of Changkufeng. Here the Japanese encountered serious resistance from 
Soviet tanks, which were handled by the on-the-spot formation of antitank teams, who charged 
the Soviet tanks when they were delayed by terrain and placed mines on or near them. The most 
publicized case spoke of a private who was repeatedly hrown off his target before at last 
boarding it and detonating his charge on the spot as a “human bullet,” a close resonation with the 
efforts of such do-or-die teams in the Russo-Japanese War.77 The offensive against Shachaofeng 
would succeed as well, pushing the Soviets into a general retreat from the area.  
The Japanese claimed at least 300 Soviet casualties cro s all engagement points (68 
were admitted on the Soviet side), at a cost of 45 Japanese killed and 133 wounded, including a 
disproportionately large number of officers who ledthe bayonet charges. Despite the success of 
the battle, this was a major problem: units had quickly lost control and cohesion after the heroic 
deaths of their leaders, preventing the continuation of effective charges, and one Japanese staff 
officer recommended that after Changkufeng “night attacks should not be conducted too often 
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because of the loss-of-leaders problem.”78 Nevertheless, the Japanese were not impressed by the 
Soviet defense of the hills, especially since the Soviets suffered very few officer casualties as 
many were observed fleeing when the fighting progressed. Soviet soldiers’ retreat as soon as 
they came under heavy fire was also criticized, suggesting that running in the face of a barrage 
“must be only natural for a foe who relies exclusively on firepower.”79 The Soviets, however, 
had not yet exposed their truly heavy firepower. The Japanese, now assuming control of the 
Soviet fortifications, had only to dig in and wait for a diplomatic end to the conflict, having 
settled the matter in “one blow” – or so they believed.80 
The response of the Red Army to the Japanese seizure of Changkufeng was delayed. No 
immediate counterattack was launched; instead, additional Russian ground forces were  
gradually moved to the area, and for the first time the Soviet Air Force would bring itself to bear 
against the Japanese from August 1 forward. Striking in large flights, around 120-150 Soviet 
aircraft attacked the Japanese forces, bombing and strafing ground troops and raiding already 
limited artillery units. Although the Soviet bombs were often poorly placed and many fell 
harmlessly into Lake Khasan or on the lower area surrounding Changkufeng, the Japanese found 
their antiaircraft (AA) capabilities woefully lacking. Inaccurate AA fire enabled the Russian 
bombers and fighters to fly low, where they could engage their targets with more ease, but the 
dismal aim of the Russian pilots denied the Japanese army an opportunity to learn how essential 
air power would be in the battles to come.81 The greater concern at Changkufeng was “why are 
there no Japanese aircraft here to fight them away?” The answer to this rested in the idea of 
waging a limited war. The IJA believed that, especially on account of the ineffectiveness of the 
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Soviet air attacks, it would be better not to risk an expansion of the local war by bringing their 
fledgling air units into battle. The other side of this is that Japan’s air force in the region was 
numerically weaker than the Soviet side and “every squadron had to be hoarded.”82 Tactical air 
power would remain a poorly understood element of Japanese military engagements until after 
Changkufeng. 
The remainder of the Chōkohō Incident would be resolved on the ground. On August 2, 
the Soviets launched their counterattack, under the leadership of Marshal Blyukher. The 
Japanese had reinforced units at Changkufeng, Shachaofeng, and Hill 52 in preparation for the 
Russian advance, and their forces successfully repuls d several daytime advances and also a 
night attack, all supported by Soviet artillery, armor, and aircraft bombardment.83 The Japanese 
defenders also gained a significant advantage after the skirmishes in the form of captured 
antitank weapons and ammunition, which were not organic to Japanese infantry units and which 
provided a much needed punch to take out enemy armor.84 The pattern of Soviet attack, Japanese 
repulsion, Soviet retreat and regrouping repeated ov r the next few days; due to their superior 
firepower and aerial cover, the Russian forces could escape and build strength relatively easily, 
under the cover of the enormous amount of ordnance t their disposal. Suetaka continued to 
move Japanese forces into the region, and by August 3 he had committed the entire division 
under his command to the defense. Soon, however, unrest began to grow among his men, 
constantly under siege by Russian shells and persevring through numerous light offensives, all 
while being unable to make a single aggressive move due to the ‘political’ insistence on waging 
a strictly limited war. Defensive warfare, after all, was a poor fit for the Japanese military ethic, 
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which stressed the attack and the glory of death in battle – not the ignominy of being smitten by 
an artillery shell fired without retribution. 
A coordinated Soviet offensive on August 5 did little to boost their spirits. Hitting with 
the full might of combined arms, including tanks, bombers, artillery, and mounted & foot 
infantry, the Soviets attacked the Japanese at all three major defensive points simultaneously, 
inflicting rising casualties – the Soviet guns had, t last, zeroed their fire in on the fortifications, 
which were smashed in several locations.85 Ammunition and supplies were beginning to run low 
as well, especially with the continual bombardment of supply lines. At Shachaofeng, one officer 
recounted repulsing the attack of forty tanks with only twenty antitank shells; only the difficult 
terrain prevented the loss of his sector.86 By evening on August 6 Changkufeng was in danger of 
being overrun; hand-to-hand fighting had taken place only fifty meters from the last fortifications, 
and the Soviets continued to reinforce their units. Heavy fighting continued throughout the 
following days, and the steady push of Soviet tanks and infantry enabled them to seriously 
threaten the crest by August 9 and begin to strike heavily against the Japanese forces on the 
hillside, already in danger of being crushed. On August 10, however, the diplomatic process at 
last brought about a ceasefire, which was put into place on the battlefield by noon the day after. 
The terms made the fighting nearly meaningless. The Japanese, in the end, had to abandon their 
hard-defended hills and fall back across the Tumen River. The Soviet flag fluttered over the 
heights of Changkufeng. 87 
 The Chōkohō Incident had within it several important lessons for the Imperial Japanese 
Army, few of them well-understood at the time. At last, they had faced the Russian army again, 
the enemy they had been planning to fight since the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. That 
                                                
85 Coox, Small War, 230-231. 
86 Coox, Small War, 236. 
87 Coox, Small War, 247. 
   
31 
enemy had, through extensive troop strength, artillery, armor, and air support, given the Japanese 
a bloody nose, but they were hardly impressed by their capacity as soldiers: “Although 
mechanization of the Red Army had attained high levels with respect to quantity, their 
weaknesses in technique and quality were laid bare,” quipped one report.88 Nevertheless, many 
IJA officers realized clearly that their equipment was not up to par; Russian grenades, sniper 
rifles, and artillery had all inflicted severe damage on Japanese troops, and antitank and 
antiaircraft operations were both difficult due to a shortage of capable weaponry. On the slopes 
of Changkufeng, Shachaofeng, and Hill 52, however, th  bushidō spirit carried the day, at least 
as far as the ceasefire, and the effort was considered a victory. One Japanese soldier is quoted as 
saying that “whereas we relied on muscle power, the enemy used engines. This rendered our 
fighting particularly hard, but we had full confidence in our spiritual strength.”89 At the 
command level, few reports were prepared on this incident, and they were hardly 
comprehensive; an internal report on “the future pers ctive in relation to the Changkufeng 
Incident” was only ten pages long.90 The overwhelming understanding of the incident wasth t 
the Japanese had only come close to losing at any poi t because they had been so severely 
restricted in terms of movement, air power, and artillery deployed, fighting what the Japanese 
Ministry of Defense’s modern (1969) military history classifies as a purely “defensive 
operation.”91 With their full forces arrayed, the Soviets would not be able to even consider 
breaking the Japanese lines, so any future conflicts would be best resolved with far more 
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aggressive rules of engagement.92 It would take another, more serious border conflict to  
disabuse them of that notion. 
Section IV: Battle of Khalkin Gol/Nomonhan Jiken (Nomonhan Incident) 
 Only a year after Changkufeng, the Japanese and Soviet armies would again meet in a 
major conflict, but the consequences at Nomonhan would be far more severe for the Japanese. 
The Nomonhan Incident would be remembered as “the baptism of modern military conflict” for 
the Imperial Japanese Army, featuring “direct, fierce fighting” with a diversity of types of 
military engagement.93 As a consequence, it would showcase the utter failure of Japanese tactics 
and equipment against a Red Army force led by none oth r than Georgi Zhukov. The stage of 
this new drama was western Manchuria, a flat zone of grasslands and deserts connected to the 
‘border’ of the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR), a Soviet satellite. In reality, there was only 
a disputed natural border at the Halha River, also known as Khalkin Gol, and the rest of the 
region was effectively undemarcated. When Manchukuo was hastily established, the border 
situation remained unclear, and the Kwantung Army determined that it would be better to leave 
the region vague until Manchukuo was strong enough to establish a clear (and beneficial) border 
line.94 By 1938, however, the Japanese and Manchukuoan governments had clarified their 
position, and internally asserted that the Halha River was the boundary of Manchukuo – cutting 
into the area claimed by the MPR by about twenty miles. Despite its unspectacular terrain, this 
area had major strategic value; if the Japanese werable to control Mongolia, they would 
severely threaten the Soviet Far Eastern territories, cripple the most effective base for Soviet 
activities in North China, and be in a perfect positi n to attack the Trans-Siberian Railway in the 
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event of war between Japan and the Soviet Union. Luckily for the Japanese, elements inside the 
MPR were maneuvering to just such an end, hoping to restore the pre-Soviet leadership structure 
as part of a Japanese protectorate.95 The Kwantung Army, never one to miss an opportunity,  
fortified the western regions of Manchukuo, and in response the MPR began a build-up along the 
border of their own. From 1935 to April 1939, 108 “shooting incidents” occurred in the disputed 
area, including some involving armor, aircraft, and artillery as well as the usual variety of 
infantry skirmishes.96 
 However, these incidents were largely between the forces of the MPR,  the Kwantung 
Army, and the Manchukuoan Army, without the direct involvement of the Soviet Union. Despite 
Stalin’s clear announcement in 1936 that the Soviet government would support the MPR against 
Japanese aggression (accompanying a ten-year mutual defense agreement), “few besides IJA 
intelligence officials detected the significance of recent changes in Russian military doctrine 
[regarding supporting the MPR].”97 This close-mindedness reflected the same attitude of 
dismissal that the Japanese had shown in all of their prior conflicts with the Soviet Union in the 
region. To make matters worse, the pro-Japanese faction within the MPR was discovered in mid-
1937, when it attempted to make a move and take advantage of Japanese mobilization for the 
Second Sino-Japanese War. They were summarily rounded up and purged by the Mongolian 
government with the full assistance of Soviet troops.98 In spite of this setback, the basic conflict 
remained, and Soviet fear of pro-Japanese sentiment in Outer Mongolia, the area closest to the 
Halha, persisted. Tensions continued to grow in the years to follow, and by 1939 the intensity of 
the border conflict was moving past the earlier disturbances between Manchukuoan and 
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Mongolian border patrols. Engagements in February and March involved as many as forty men 
per side, all incidentally centered around a small town called Nomonhan, about ten miles from 
the Halha on the Manchukuoan side.99 As the combat there began to grow in intensity, Japanese 
staff officers noted their frustration in even attempting to locate the tiny town on their theater 
maps; surely, it seemed, the issue would be resolved without escalation.100 Their hopes would 
not be borne out, as a vicious cycle of reinforcement would send this conflict spiraling toward 
all-out war. In the ensuing conflict, Soviet forces would conclusively show the weaknesses of 
Japanese tactics through their punishing artillery capabilities, huge quantities of armor, and 
willingness to commit troops to battle in large numbers in order to guarantee victory. 
 On the eve of the outbreak of major hostilities, the main Kwantung Army force in the 
region was the 23rd Division, commanded by the capable but untested Lieutenant General 
Komatsubara Michitarō, with a total strength of about 13,000 men. The 23rd Division was 
“green,” with a significant number of one-year volunteers, cadets, and reservists in leadership 
positions; very few military academy graduates held major command positions.101 Their 
equipment and arsenal was in even worse shape than their officer corps: they had a single 
tankette (very light tank) company, one transport truck unit, and some cavalry – hardly a 
sufficient loadout for operations on the steppes on M golia, a far cry from the hills of 
Changkufeng. Armor and artillery would clearly dominate on this battlefield, and the 23rd 
Division was woefully incapable in that sector as well, equipped with only the Type 38 75mm 
artillery gun, a relic from 1907, and a small number of tankettes and armored cars. The antitank 
capabilities of the infantry were equally poor; thereconnaissance regiment had no antitank 
weapons whatsoever, and even the engineer companies had only explosive charges. Heavy 
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weapons included only 64 total artillery pieces, including the 1907 antiques and seventeen 37mm 
anti-tank guns, and on average each unit had fewer light and heavy machine guns than any other 
division of the Kwantung Army.102 In short, this was not the elite force expected to be facing a 
disputed border with significant Soviet strength available on the other side. Here again the 
Japanese underestimation of their enemy shows itself – the 23rd Division was a perfectly suitable 
fighting force for effectively handling Mongolian cavalry and light infantry forces, but they were 
not prepared for a major encounter with a modernized R d Army, yet that was the task they were 
given. The other aspect, of course, is that the Kwantung Army was busy with interior operations 
at the time, and more than two-thirds of available divisions were already deployed to China. 
Already fighting a major war, IJA command could notafford to provide more men or supplies to 
the Manchukuoan western border, despite its enormous significance in the event of a Soviet 
offensive. This combination of overstretch and underestimation would have dramatic 
consequences when a small border skirmish again spiraled out of control, providing at last a 
thorough test for nearly twenty years of “Japanese tactical innovation, alterations in force 
structure, and doctrinal development designed specifically to fight the Soviets.”103 
 The early days of the Nomonhan Incident are unclear at best due to contesting stories on 
both sides; however, some general facts can be assembled. On May 4, 1939, a Mongolian 
cavalry force of around thirty to fifty horsemen, part of the lightly equipped army of the MPR, 
moved toward the Balshagal Heights near Nomonhan and began to establish an outpost. From 
the Japanese perspective (with the border at the Halha), this was an intrusion; from the MPR 
perspective, this was within their boundary. Some Japanese reports suggest a fortified base was 
being constructed, while the MPR and Soviet story is that the cavalry unit was only grazing its 
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horses along the eastern bank of the river. In any c se, a firefight soon broke out between a 
Manchukuoan Army border patrol-in-force and the MPR cavalry detachment, resulting in a 
retreat across the river by the Mongolian horsemen. The next day saw a second clash between 
the two forces (who counterattacked whom is disputed), and the horsemen were most likely 
driven back across the river a second time.104 
 Events quickly snowballed due to the strictures of Kwantung Army Operations Order 
1488, which encapsulated the new ideal for resolving border disputes along the boundaries of 
Manchukuo. The plan was based, just as earlier thinking at Changkufeng had been, on the idea of 
victory through ‘one blow’; in the event of a disturbance, Kwantung Army forces would “nip 
[enemy] ambitions in the bud by completely destroying them,” and to that end they were 
authorized to cross any poorly defined borders and “establish boundaries on their own 
initiative.”105 Order 1488 was not a carte blanche for carrying out aggressive action, however. 
“Unnecessary ground movements” were “forbidden,” and o ly “unavoidable action” was to be 
taken to the ends of a “definite mission.” Nevertheless, local troops were authorized to 
“challenge the enemy courageously and endeavor to triumph in their zone of action without 
concerning themselves about the consequences, which ill be the responsibility of higher 
headquarters.”106 As leader of the 23rd Division, Komatsubara reacted quickly and heavily to the 
May 10-11 incidents with the authority granted to him under this directive, drawing up a plan to 
commit his reconnaissance regiment, two infantry companies, and all available Manchukuoan 
Army forces, supported by all available trucks in the region (including those commandeered 
from locals), against the Mongolian cavalry forces. He also requested that reconnaissance aircraft 
and fighters be attached to his command from the Kwantung Army, and was in fact granted both 
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fighters and light bombers numbering twenty eight planes. Light tanks being field tested in the 
region were also placed under his control.107 This was a tremendous excess of force to handle, at 
most, three hundred Mongolian horsemen, including reinforcements from an MPR outpost at 
Tamsag, but it was the precise implementation of the spirit of Operations Order 1488. Here was 
an example of a Japanese overestimation, but at its base was the same belief in the ‘one blow’ 
philosophy and in enemy unwillingness to expand operations that had made Changkufeng a near 
disaster. Order 1488, rather than preventing escalation s it was ostensibly intended, would 
instead set off the most devastating battle of the entire border conflict. 
 On May 15 a small, mobile Japanese force, along with a flight of light bombers, engaged 
the Mongolian forces, driving them across the Halha nd also dropping bombs well into territory 
recognized as part of the MPR even by Japanese standards.108 Komatsubara hoped that the mere 
appearance of his forces “would frighten away the trespassers.”109 Only two days after this 
‘punitive action,’ however, MPR forces reappeared on the eastern side of the river, a bold move 
which Komatsubara undoubtedly interpreted as a provocation. Mustering a new force of more 
than 1,600 Japanese soldiers and 450 Manchukuoan trops, Komatsubara prepared to move 
immediately against the MPR cavalry, but warnings from Kwantung Army staff officers against 
unnecessary haste caused him to wait until May 27 to launch the attack.110 In the mean time, the 
air war over the Halha was intensifying following the earlier bombing runs, and as many as 
seventeen enemy aircraft were destroyed by the fighters attached to the 23rd Division, who were 
taking a very aggressive stance in the air and had taken no losses in the combat.111 With the 
significant reconnaissance information available from these overflights, Komatsubara and his 
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staff drew up plans for a major attack against the MPR forces. Forces would move by night to 
encircle the enemy, then attack in a double envelopment assault which would cut off all possible 
escape routes and lead to the complete destruction of MPR forces east of the Halha. Rapid mop-
up operations would follow on the other bank, after which Japanese forces would withdraw to 
their side. There was “no concern” in the planning for an enemy stand or counterattack; the focus 
was entirely on preventing their inevitable escape. The Japanese, after all, did not think highly of 
the MPR horsemen, whom they had already forced backseveral times with only minor fighting. 
Even the presence of Soviet forces, confirmed by aerial r connaissance, was hardly considered, 
since their “purge-ridden” leadership was unlikely to be able to take the initiative.112 It was a 
certain victory in the minds of the Japanese, especially when such small numbers were involved. 
 The assault began to go wrong almost at once. On the morning of May 28, after moving 
all night, the Japanese cavalry reconnaissance forcof about 220 men which was to cut off the 
retreat was annihilated. Their destruction is a telling example of the tactical errors that would 
plague the Japanese throughout the Nomonhan conflict. Led by Azuma Yaozo, the recon force of 
horsemen, light tanks, and trucks proceeded in a rapid drive through the left side of the MPR 
defenses about eleven miles from Nomonhan; they encountered no resistance until about 6:00 
AM, when four 120mm artillery pieces began to fire on the force from the elevated western 
shore of the Halha; shortly thereafter enemy counterattacks against Azuma’s position began, 
pressed by around 120 infantry and 10 armored vehicles. Near 10:00, Azuma came under attack 
from the flanks and rear by a well-equipped enemy force, and he was forced to make a fall back 
behind a nearby slope in the land to avoid indirect fire, which had grown to include mortars and 
antitank guns as well as the howitzers. The Japanese recon unit had no organic artillery to speak 
of, and there was none available to call in to quiet th  enemy guns, which harshly limited their 
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tactical possibilities. Hoping for a breakthrough from the main force, which Azuma believed was 
fighting nearby, the recon unit chose to stand rather an retreat. Digging defensive positions 
with their helmets, since they were not equipped with entrenching tools, Azuma’s forces held on 
desperately.113 By the night, despite suffering several casualties and losses of equipment and 
receiving only meager reinforcements, the Japanese b gan to make plans for a decisive 
counterattack in the darkness. Soviet units in the area anticipated this, however, and launched 
their own attack with 500-600 infantry, supported by tanks, artillery, and searchlights. Azuma 
rapidly organized his men and ordered an offensive by all available soldiers, who drove the 
Russians back when they were only fifty meters from the Japanese position. The cost was high – 
Azuma lost both of his company commanders (they led th  charge), crippling his leadership 
structure. The Soviets were not finished however, and although a second offensive was again 
driven back at 3:00 AM, their artillery restarted its bombardment at first light, and with its 
support about 650 Soviet infantry with several tanks enveloped and slowly pressed Azuma’s unit, 
which had dwindled to less than 100 men. Ammunition and supplies were devastated by artillery 
fire. By 3:00 P.M., Soviet troops were again within fifty meters in the front, left, and right 
sectors of the recon force, which now began to launch suicidal ‘human bullet’ attacks against 
Soviet tanks with gasoline cans and demolition charges. After 6:00 P.M., Azuma called on the 
last 19 survivors to join him, and they charged out of the trench; they were instantly cut down by 
Soviet gunfire.114 It turned out that several units had tried to reach Azuma throughout the day, 
but all had been smashed by Soviet artillery and tak-supported infantry counteroffensives. 
Additionally, the main detachment of the task force had failed to break through and rout the 
enemy, due in large part to the long range of Soviet artillery and tank guns compared to the 
                                                
113 Drea, Nomonhan, 28. 
114 Coox, Nomonhan, 206-212. 
   
40 
heavy machine guns which made up the bulk of Japanese fir power in the detachment.115 When 
reinforcements were critically needed to ensure the success of the main offensive, all other units 
had already been deployed in flanking maneuvers as part of the battle plan. By May 30, the task 
force was ordered to disengage, asserting success on the basis that the “enemy’s limited 
intentions on the right side of the Halha were smashed and the foe’s fighting spirit was eroded, 
causing him to remain on the left bank [for] now.”116 Despite this setback, the Kwantung Army 
was optimistic that they could “drop the matter.”117 
 Several lessons were quickly learned in the aftermath. Insufficient teamwork, poor unit 
cohesion, and weak “spiritual inculcation” were cited as causing major problems for the infantry 
offensive. Units clearly needed to be reorganized, as combining, almost at random, trucks, 
tankettes, cavalry, and infantry created units that could only move as quickly as their slowest 
member, and which could not produce the kind of uniied offensive demanded by steppe warfare 
against a fortified enemy. “No thought had been given” to the chance that Soviet artillery and 
armor would be available to support the MPR horsemen, and Azuma’s force in particular lacked 
any antitank weapons whatsoever, despite ultimately facing 30-40 tracked armored vehicles.118 
Japanese artillery support was virtually nonexistent, in large part because only ineffectual 
equipment was available, but Komatsubara nevertheless received serious criticism from within 
the Kwantung Army for his failure to attach heavy weapons to Azuma’s unit.119 Attacks from the 
air had been powerful, but uncoordinated; the Japanese had not developed a philosophy of close 
air support, and fighters and bombers operated on their own. On a unit level, several officers had 
been lost early in the combat as well, exemplified by Azuma’s early charge which cost him two 
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company commanders. At the base of all of these issues was the Japanese intelligence failure 
regarding Soviet intervention. When Komatsubara was m king the plans for the task force 
assault, he had virtually no information available to him other than knowledge that a Soviet 
mechanized battalion with around 100 attached aircraft was near the MPR forces. To make 
matters worse, no one expected or believed that the Soviets would become heavily involved in 
the fighting at Nomonhan, a gross underestimation of the Soviet commitment to sustaining its 
Mongolian satellite.120 In short, the 23rd Division had certainly failed to learn from Changkufeng 
in the east, and was making all of the same mistake in the west. These new lessons, however, 
were not applied in time for the next major action one month later. 
 In the intervening time, both sides began to muster reinforcements. The Soviet Union 
made a major change in the command of the forces arrayed in support of the MPR, as well: on 
June 5, Deputy Commander Georgi Zhukov arrived at Tamsag, the headquarters of the 57th 
Corps, the mechanized group which had successfully repulsed the earlier offensive. Zhukov, who 
would later become the most decorated Russian officer of all time for his counteroffensive 
against Nazi Germany, represented a new generation of Red Army officers who had survived the 
purge and taken charge of rebuilding Soviet martial might. Assuming command, he quickly 
assessed the situation and found the preparations and forces in the area insufficient for dealing 
with what he expected to be a continuing “Japanese military adventure.”121 He requested major 
reinforcements, and received during June a tank brigade, three mechanized brigades, a motorized 
rifle brigade, a heavy artillery detachment, and an additional MPR cavalry division, as well as 
more than one hundred fighter aircraft and twenty oe special pilots, all recipients of the Gold 
Star Medal of the Hero of the Soviet Union. These forces began to assemble along the border as 
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soon as they arrived, and throughout the month several s vere ground attacks against 
Manchukuoan Army units were reported in the region, ending any illusions in the Kwantung 
Army that the issue had been resolved.122 On the Japanese side, the Kwantung Army formed a 
new, powerful task force from the core of the elite 7 h Division, including a motorized infantry 
regiment, two antitank gun batteries, two regimental gun batteries, a truck company, two tank 
regiments, a field artillery regiment, an antiaircraft battery, an engineer regiment, a transport 
regiment, and medical and signal elements, all under the command of Lieutenant General 
Yasuoka Masaomi. The Yasuoka task force was then placed under Komatsubara’s command, in 
keeping with the Kwantung Army decision to place all confidence in his actions in the western 
theater.123 The 23rd Division was also reinforced directly with antiaircraft and antitank guns as 
well as additional infantry companies. The battle plan again involved a crushing blow against the 
enemy, “a butcher’s axe used to dice a chicken,” followed by a “temporary” crossing of the 
Halha to ensure the enemy’s destruction rather than retreat. This would be a “short war” fought 
to a “quick and decisive conclusion,” the ideal for the Japanese strategists involved in the 
planning.124 Woefully inaccurate intelligence estimates placed the Soviet-MPR force at around 
1,000 men, ten field guns, ten AA guns, and some arored vehicles.125 Not all were unconcerned, 
however. On the day that the main formation of the 23rd Division left for the front to carry out 
the second offensive, Colonel Chikazawa, chief of the ordnance bureau, shot himself in the head. 
He was well-known for being appalled by the “awful equipment” being given to the troops, 
                                                
122 Coox, Nomonhan, 252, 255. 
123 Coox, Nomonhan, 260-261. 
124 Drea, Nomonhan, 29. 
125 Coox, Nomonhan, 262. 
   
43 
equipment that he was powerless to improve.126 The next clash between the IJA and the Red 
Army would prove the veracity of his concerns. 
 Spearhead elements of the attack force arrived on June 22 and quickly became involved 
in local skirmishes with the enemy, which was now identifiable as “definitely and entirely 
Russian,” rather than a mix of Russian and Mongolian forces.127 On the 25th, the attack order 
was issued, and troop concentration completed on the 29th. On July 2-3 a daring river-crossing 
operation was launched across a single hastily-emplaced bridge under the cover of night as well 
as a thunderstorm, which quickly seized the local high ground from unprepared Soviet defenders. 
However, the Japanese encountered a defense-in-depth istinct from earlier operations; breaking 
through a single line only brought them face-to-face with another set of fortifications, greatly 
reducing the potential of the hand-to-hand engagement favored by their tactical doctrine.128 A 
heavy counterattack came around 9:00AM on July 3, blunting the Japanese offensive and forcing 
them to take defensive positions on a battlefield that suddenly became “black with enemy 
armor.”129 The defense was successful for a short time, and a significant number of enemy 
armored vehicles and tanks were destroyed by ‘human bullet’ tactics, including firebombs, 
grenades thrown into hatches, and direct boarding wth swords drawn.130 However, Zhukov was 
not about to lose the vital heights, and immediately mobilized the 11th Tank Brigade, the 3rd 
Battalion, and all available MPR elements against the Japanese forces struggling to gain a 
foothold across the Halha. One Japanese officer reported counting as many as 500 enemy 
armored vehicles appearing on the horizon, and he estimated that as many as 1,000 in total may 
have come to strike the exposed task force, which had only limited artillery support with which 
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to resist. Without antitank rifles and with only a few gun batteries, the Japanese turned to filling 
cider bottles with gasoline, which would ignite when shattered against the hot armor shell of the 
Soviet tanks. Their armor consumed by flame, the Soviet tankers would flee out the hatches, 
where they were met with a hail of rifle fire or flashing blades.131 It was a crude but effective 
strategy which destroyed several enemy tanks, but the overall effect was insignificant – when 
their single bridge over the Halha came under attack from enemy aircraft and long-range artillery, 
Japanese officers decided to make a movement back across the bridge by night, before they were 
trapped and annihilated by enemy armor. After a disorganized retreat in which several Japanese 
units were lost to pressing Soviet tank and artilley fire, Japanese engineers blew up the bridge 
they had constructed across the Halha to prevent pursuing Soviet tanks from striking their rear. It 
was the first bridge of their own construction to be demolished by the Imperial Japanese 
Army.132  
 The Japanese would never again try to cross the Halha River, where the assault of the 
task force had been crushed by Soviet armor.133 Although Japanese attacks and Russian 
counterattacks continued into mid-July, no actions achieved any decisive results. At last, 
Komatsubara ordered a pull-back in preparation for staking everything on a general offensive. 
Soviet forces maintained heavy pressure during the build-up, launching artillery attacks 
continuously, probing with armor, and constructing fortifications while reinforcing all front-line 
units as they moved across the secured Halha River and towards the Japanese positions.134 Every 
hour guaranteed that the Japanese offensive would be that much more difficult, especially 
considering that they had received no reinforcements a d would be deploying essentially the 
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same force as had been used on the July 2-3 operations. The plan was straightforward and 
optimistic: after two hours of bombardment by artillery, infantry rifle units would push to the 
riverbank with the support of the air force. The second phase would be a cleanup operation 
securing the main bridgehead of the Soviet forces th n quieting the remaining artillery.135 The 
plan was an elegant, classic offensive, but it was completely disconnected from the reality of the 
battlefield situation. Japanese forces would have minimal armored vehicles and few tanks to 
match the enemy. Although their artillery had been rei forced by units scavenged from the 
training school at Hailar, it was still unable to approach the Soviet volume of fire.136 Additionally, 
no changes had been made in terms of antitank capabilities, which were now based almost 
entirely on gasoline-filled cider bottles made on the field and used as Molotov cocktails. 
The attack began on the morning of July 23. After an additional hour of bombardment 
when observers reported insufficient destructive eff cts against the enemy fortifications, the 
Japanese artillery soon turned to attacking the Soviet guns to provide suppression for the 
advancing infantry. However, their guns could not reach the more powerful weapons of their 
enemy, which were able to fire unrestrained for the entire offensive.137 The ground attack was 
bogged down after enjoying some early successes, particul rly once Soviet armor entered the 
fray, and artillery pounded Japanese forces almost constantly at every point. The few precious 
Japanese tanks used in the offensive were quickly left as “smoldering wrecks” after several 
overconfident drives put them into heavy Soviet fire without infantry support.138 After two days 
and two nights of attacks, they still had not made it to the river, or even reclaimed the ground lost 
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in early July.139 By the 25th, the offensive was effectively over, after failing to achieve any of its 
goals. Soviet artillery and effective combined arms were directly to blame, but the failure of the 
action was already ensured in the tactical planning phase, which had dramatically underestimated 
the challenge of pushing the enemy back across the Halha after allowing more than ten days for 
fortification and defensive build-up on their part. So long as the Japanese were forced to fight on 
the defensive, they were unable to make use of their prized offensive tactics, which slashed their 
chances of success dramatically.140 Furthermore, with more than half of their doubled t n-day 
load depleted and unable to replenish their stocks, the ammunition situation for Japanese field 
guns was a “main reason for calling off the offensive.”141 A Kwantung Army document reported 
that from July 23-25, the Type 38 field guns alone fired 4068 high-explosive shells and 6569 
shrapnel shells, a total rate of fire of more than two shells per minute, continuously – but even 
this volume of fire was nothing in comparison to the Soviet guns.142 One IJA officer noted after 
the battle that “underdog tactics may be fine for infantrymen, but not for artillery.”143  
Following the defeat, combat transitioned into “a wr of attrition,” and Japanese forces 
began to dig in, constantly under indirect fire in an area with few natural obstacles.144 Their 
fieldworks were limited by low supplies, and logistical difficulties magnified this problem, since 
barriers, building materials, and essential antitank supplies and weaponry were all in very short 
supply.145 On top of this, morale was continually depressed by the falling of artillery; soldiers 
commonly had to defecate in their positions and could not cook due to the smoke from fire 
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revealing their location to the Soviet guns.146 It was the perfect opportunity for a general Soviet 
counterattack on a battered, exposed foe. 
 Zhukov would earn his reputation as a brilliant commander for his leadership in the 
European theater, but it was his offensive against the Japanese in August of 1939 which began 
his dramatic career. He devised an attack to be launched no later than August 20, with the goal of 
completely evicting all Japanese forces from the area originally claimed by Soviet demarcations 
of the Mongolian border. To guarantee success against the overconfident Kwantung Army, who 
was only slightly reinforcing their endangered task force, Zhukov maximized his available troops, 
obtaining from the Soviet interior two rifle divisions and a rifle regiment, a tank brigade, an 
airborne brigade, an artillery regiment, an antiaircr ft regiment, and several tank companies, as 
well as additional attack aircraft. To supply such an enormous force, Zhukov organized a 
massive truck force with at least 4,000 vehicles driving daily to provide adequate supplies. In 
comparison, in their internal documents the IJA considered 200 trucks to be “many” – perhaps 
helping to explain their continuous trouble with supplies throughout the incident.147 These Soviet 
movements were visible in a number of circumstances to Japanese intelligence, including via 
aerial reconnaissance, but no countermoves were mad, perhaps on account of too much 
“wishful thinking” by the commanders who were unprepared for the Russian tidal wave that was 
about to wash over their positions.148 The total mass of forces prepared by the Soviets included 
57,000 men, 498 tanks, and 346 armored cars, all striking together across a thirty kilometer 
front.149 Compared with the first battles of the incident, which had involved hundreds of men at 
most, the escalation that had taken place is staggerin . 
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 Zhukov’s offensive came as scheduled in the early morning of August 20, beginning with 
an enormous wave of artillery fire at 5:45 AM, whic knocked out the few Japanese antiaircraft 
batteries, revealed targets for the Soviet air force, and collapsed many fortifications, “burying 
their occupants in sand, dirt, and debris.”150 As the artillery fell, more than 150 bombers and their 
fighter escorts struck at positions across the Japanese-controlled area, including direct attacks 
against the lines as well as raids against emplacements in the rear. This “storm of fire” continued 
until 9 AM, when the infantry and armor assaults began en masse, in several places pushing 
directly through the hard-hit Japanese forces to the border claimed by the MPR. Japanese 
artillery was completely unavailable for as many as ninety minutes after the attack began, and 
even then was often able to fire only in short barrages due to the swift redirection of Russian 
suppressing fire.151 This was the same pattern that had been repeated again and again in the brief 
war, but Zhukov’s offensive was the most severe instance of it that the Japanese would face, 
combining superior fire support with encirclement by armor and fast infantry movement which 
devastated the Japanese positions and showcased their ramatic tactical weaknesses. 
 Despite their advantages and early successes, however, the Soviet forces did not 
immediately break through at all points. In the central region, Japanese defenders held steady 
initially, and a force of 600 Japanese held the Fui Heights for three days, until the commitment 
of extra Russian armor, flamethrower tanks, and artillery concluded the stalemate.152 Isolated 
Japanese positions would be “cleaned up” by Soviet artillery, accurately massed against the 
position and firing continuously to create what observers called a “pillar of fire.”153 The 
seemingly endless flow of enemy reinforcements and fire support was disheartening, and 
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Japanese morale began to sag.154 After four days of desperate clinging, the Kwantung Army was 
at last organized sufficiently to launch a counterat ack, but planning was “slipshod” and the 
preparations were made “almost overnight,” since the Japanese had never considered having to 
face an attack of the magnitude now battering their lines. Japanese soldiers ate and drank what 
would be, for many, their last meal, then refilled their cider bottles with gasoline to be used 
against Soviet tanks.155 The forces marked to spearhead the counterattack, few of them at full 
strength and with largely dysfunctional support, openly questioned their chances of success. But 
when headquarters was consulted, they were only assured that “the offensive could be pushed 
through ‘because we were Japanese soldiers.’”156 
 On August 24 the effort was set underway in the worst f conditions for Japanese tactics: 
a direct attack in daylight without scouting or softening by artillery fire. Predictably, the assault 
was a disaster, with the disorganized units smashing t emselves against the Russian lines in what 
Coox compares to the charge of the Light Brigade.157 Crushed by tanks, indirect fire, and even 
their own light bombers, who had not been properly alerted of the offensive, the Japanese forces 
engaged the strong, supported Soviet lines with little result. Techniques which had once been 
effective, such as firebombs and light antitank mines, had been quickly rendered meaningless by 
the development of wire tank netting and the use of improved medium tanks by the Soviet army, 
which proved highly resistant to these methods of attack.158 These changes multiplied the already 
pronounced lack of Japanese antitank capabilities, making Soviet armor virtually unstoppable 
and allowing it to slowly squeeze the Japanese forces, which could do little but hope for artillery 
or air support that rarely came. Ammunition shortages limited the effectiveness of the antitank 
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weapons they did have; in the entire period from August 21 to 31, Japanese heavy machine guns 
fired only 168,900 rounds of armor-piercing ammunitio , representing a little more than six 
hours of continuous fire.159 Sniper fire disabled many of these guns and turned back even 
Japanese night attacks, remaining accurate by moonlight thanks to the quality of Soviet rifle 
optics.160 Three days of counterattacks resulted only in meaningless – and heavy – losses for the 
Japanese, as the Russians continued their hammer blows. By August 31, the new configuration 
of battle lines made it unmistakably clear who would be the victor. Japanese forces had been 
uniformly evicted from the Nomonhan region, pushed back across the border claimed by the 
Soviets and the MPR.161  
Though hard fighting continued into September, the Japanese were never able to come 
close to recapturing their lines, and at last diplomacy lead to a cease-fire on September 16 – a 
truce that could only be understood as a “devastating defeat” for the Kwantung Army.162 The 
Japanese government could hardly countenance opening a  all-out war with the Soviet Union, 
and that was the course that the Kwantung Army was now set on in the aftermath of Zhukov’s 
offensive. The Soviets, for their part, had new ambitions in Europe to carry out, namely the 
division of Poland, and had little interest in going further near Nomonhan; they had achieved 
their goals and upheld the defense pact with the Mongolian People’s Republic. Though met with 
fury and frustration by many Japanese officers in Manchukuo, who still hoped to launch a 
retaliatory strike, the cease-fire came with flawless timing for the Red Army, who would launch 
their invasion of Poland on the very next day. 
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 The final balance sheet for Nomonhan was grave, showing how dangerously close the 
battle came to moving far beyond its ‘limited war’ ideals. Though the numbers are inconsistent 
from source to source, Japanese internal records admit that “at least” 18,000 casualties (dead, 
missing, or wounded) were sustained, possibly over 20,000, from a total manpower participation 
of 75,738, for a casualty rate of about 25 percent. Komatsubara’s 23rd Division, which bore the 
brunt of the early fighting, suffered an over 76 percent loss rate, at least 30 percent of which was 
from death. Some regiments were more than 70 percent destroyed, with one, the 71st Infantry, 
sustaining a 93.5 percent casualty rate. The average c sualty rate among ground troops (70.6 
percent for infantry) was the highest ever experienced by the Imperial Japanese Army up to that 
point, eclipsing the 14.4 percent loss of infantry in the Russo-Japanese War, the 28 percent rate 
at Mukden, and the 24.7 percent rate at Changkufeng.163 Also striking is the incidence of officer 
loss: 82 percent of battalion commanders and above, 72 percent of company commanders, and 
78 percent of platoon leaders were killed or wounded in the fighting, leaving many units 
shattered and without a proper command structure throug out the conflict.164 
 The medical records indicating causes of death or wounding are also telling. In contrast 
to the experience of 1905, in which 60.5 percent of casualties were caused by small arms in the 
assault on Port Arthur, at Nomonhan only 35.9 percent of the wounds and 37.3 percent of deaths 
were attributable to enemy rifles. More than 50 percent of both categories came instead from the 
relentless barrages of Soviet artillery. Hand grenad s also inflicted 3.7 percent of wounds 
sustained by Japanese ground forces, but the reports indicate that no wounds ever resulted from 
hand-to-hand combat with the Russians.165 
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 Soviet admissions of casualties only totaled 9,284, but Zhukov’s willingness to spend his 
soldiers’ blood was well-known after Nomonhan.166 Furthermore, Japanese estimates from the 
observations of the 13th Field Artillery alone match his number, and consequently most sources 
have placed it under heavy speculation.167 Fortunately, recent research by Russian scholars has 
finally delivered numbers from within Soviet archives. These sources report that from an 
“average monthly strength” of 69,101 men there were 23,899 total Soviet casualties, including 
7,974 irrecoverable losses (dead or missing in action), revealing the enormous expenditure in 
manpower made by the Red Army to overcome the Japanese, in spite of their advantages in 
weapons and support.168 Their total casualty rates are stunning, as well: 11.5 percent 
irrecoverable losses and 23.1 percent sick and wounded, even higher than the IJA. Unlike the 
Japanese, however, their officers fared better, on average, than their common soldiers: 30.2 
percent of Soviet commanders and 29.3 percent of non-commissioned officers were killed or 
wounded during the conflict.169 Regarding types of wounds, 44.2 percent came from bullets, and 
48.2 percent from artillery, mines, or grenades; in a testament to Japanese skill with “cold steel,” 
only 0.8 percent of those who met it escaped only wounded.170 Intriguingly, Soviet archives 
suggest that “61,000 Japanese were killed, wounded, or captured” with “about 25,000” of those 
killed – this is only about 10,000 less than the entir  Japanese force involved in the conflict, 
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raising questions about the accuracy of Soviet record-keeping.171 In any case, it is abundantly 
clear that the cost of Nomonhan was tremendous on both sides. 
 The experiences at Nomonhan offered the Imperial Japanese Army a wealth of new 
information on what war with a modern, well-equipped army was like; after all, the experience 
of so-called ‘limited war’ at Nomonhan had included infantry, armor, and artillery operations, 
major logistical networks, air-ground and air-air combat by the air forces on both sides, and even 
close air support and tactical bombing had been featur d. Indeed, the official Japanese military 
history of the conflict cites it as the IJA’s “first exposure to modern, combined arms warfare.”172 
On this desolate patch of land, the future battles of World War II were given a full dress 
rehearsal, yet most of the world failed to watch. Te lessons for the Japanese were unmistakable. 
Losses of men and especially officers had been disastrous to the combat capability of individual 
units, which were often recommitted piecemeal to the battlefield where they became fodder for 
the same enemies that had broken them previously. The denial of the legitimacy of retreat as a 
means of concluding a battle, combined with the lack of any concept of a ‘tactical withdrawal,’ 
led to either meaningless death on the battlefield or shameful suicide after the court martial that 
was sure to come for cowardice. Furthermore, Japanese technology and weaponry had been 
shown inferior; they were unable to seriously match the Red Army in any category on the ground, 
from rifles and grenades up to tanks and artillery, p ompting a major investigation into the 
armament of the entire Kwantung Army by the Chief of Staff.173 Though many battle 
experiences do suggest that the individual Japanese soldier was a more bold, tenacious, and 
aggressive fighter than his Russian counterpart, and that his ‘spiritual superiority’ did provide a 
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measurable difference in hand-to-hand combat effectiveness, these assets were forcibly 
countered by a high volume of automatic fire, Russian defense capabilities, and fire support. This 
experience would be repeated in the Pacific War and never reconsidered as a tactic by the 
Japanese; the kamikaze ‘special attack squadrons’ of 1944-45 can find as part of their lineage the 
do-or-die anti-tank attack squads at Nomonhan. As late as 1943, Japanese officers are recorded 
as having expressed ideas that “lack of equipment gave us Japanese a chance to demonstrate our 
superior spirit and valor.”174 Regardless of whether this ideology was basically an effort to 
disguise and disregard inferior industrial capabilities, its result was to lead to a reliance on dated 
tactics that committed ineffectually armed forces against a superior enemy and hoped for the best. 
Persistent underestimation of the enemy and denial of the technological reality of the battlefield 
were the main causes of the defeat at Nomonhan, and would remain the cause of IJA defeat until 
the very end of their efforts. Significantly, the dfeat at Nomonhan would end Japanese 
ambitions northward. They would look instead to Southeastern Asia and, fatefully, the West. 
Conclusion: Tactical Failure and Strategic Underestimation 
 
 The narratives of Japanese defeat at Changkufeng and Nomonhan share a number of 
fundamental similarities despite their pronounced differences in terrain and scope of committed 
forces. In both cases, the Imperial Japanese Army faced an enemy that they considered inferior 
and incapable in comparison to themselves, yet despite uffering serious losses and being 
presented with tactical situations that they were incapable of effectively handling, they failed to 
evince any willingness to adjust their doctrine or reconsider their new, modern enemy. Even 
when serious studies of the defeat were conducted as arly as September of 1939, the many 
accurate observations and recommendations within went virtually unheeded throughout the Asia-
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Pacific War.175 The Imperial Japanese Army, and the praised Kwantung Army in particular, 
proved itself to be an “anachronism,” which persisted as vigorously as it did on the field of battle 
only due to the raw temerity of individual Japanese soldiers and officers.176 
 A well-understood component of modern warfare since World War I was the use of 
artillery to deliver sustained indirect fire against enemy positions, both to soften up defenses in 
preparation for an attack and also to cover a retreat. However, by 1938 new advances in shell 
size, muzzle velocity, and accuracy had increased both the range and deadliness of artillery. 
These features, combined with large gun emplacements, abled an army to deliver a heavy 
barrage to a very focused area, greatly enhancing the success rate for the subsequent infantry 
assault. While the Red Army brought an enormous number of heavy guns to the battlefield, the 
Japanese always felt bereft of fire support. Their guns, few in number, of lower caliber, and often 
of aging design, could not provide a volume of firecomparable to their Soviet counterparts, and 
commonly Japanese fire could not even reach the Soviet emplacements to suppress them during 
an attack. This proved to be a major shortcoming in the border wars, which were composed 
significantly of static defense rather than mobile attle. Even when the Japanese were able to 
rout their enemy in open combat, Soviet artillery was consistently able to cover the retreat and 
prevent effective pursuit operations, especially on the open steppes surrounding Nomonhan. The 
Kwantung Army did not provide substantially increasd numbers of modern artillery even once 
this became apparent; as a 1965 Japanese military stud  imply concluded, “Japanese tacticians 
had not kept pace with changing weapons technology.” 177 This failure enabled the Soviets to 
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control the flow of battle via indirect fire and help d to overcome even the most well-fortified 
Japanese positions on the hills of Manchuria and Mongolia. 
 Tanks and tankettes in serious numbers were new additions to the battlefield on all sides 
in 1938-39, but while the Red Army rushed to put as m ny at the front as logistically possible, 
the Japanese never deployed more than a few small, ineffectual groups. Even then, Japanese 
tankettes operated largely on their own, where theyw re vulnerable due to their light armor, 
poor visibility, and relatively weak armament – thesame problems that had plagued tank 
operations in World War I. In contrast, the Soviet Union effectively implemented a modern 
combined arms doctrine which saw tanks used alongside infantry, where they could be supported 
and defended against attack while using their armor and weaponry to break enemy hard points 
and clear fortifications and positions. Fighting on the defensive against such forces required 
significant antitank capabilities in the form of heavy machine guns (against tankettes) or mobile 
guns, preferably integrated with infantry units, enabling them to knock out tanks before they 
could reach the lines. Japanese ‘human bullet’ attacks, in place of these weapons, cost dearly in 
terms of human life and thus battlefield potential. Furthermore, as the developments of August 
1939 demonstrated, weapons like firebombs and lightmines could be countered with advances in 
armor and defensive systems – advances to which the Japanese army was unable to respond in 
time to turn the course. The willing official acceptance of the firebomb, originally made from 
discarded cider bottles, as a primary method of antitank warfare embodies the IJA’s failure to 
effectively respond to the new threat of armor on the battlefield. 
 All of these flaws manifested alongside infantry operations, but in that realm, too, the 
Kwantung Army confronted a number of issues it was unwilling to correct. Although the fearless 
do-or-die attitude of many Japanese officers and soldiers had enabled the great successes of the 
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Russo-Japanese War, the battlefield and arsenals of 1938-39 were even less forgiving to hand-to-
hand fighters than those of 1904-05, and the dramatic numbers of Japanese officers who perished 
in sword charges and melee combat greatly undermined the combat effectiveness of their units, 
demanding a reconsideration of how close combat should be carried out. Exacerbating this issue 
were the deficiencies in the armament of the individual Japanese soldier. While the Russians 
were able to pelt the Japanese with a seemingly endless number of stick grenades, Japanese 
soldiers complained of the difficulty of use of their own grenades and their limited availability. 
Furthermore, Russian snipers became feared for their precise fire, which added to the drain on 
the Japanese officer pool. At the very heart of the issue was the entire Japanese attitude towards 
the enemy on the battlefield – the continuous theme of underestimation. IJA officers persisted in 
forlorn hope defenses and attacks long after it was clear that the effort would fail, often for little 
gain. Just as advised in the IJA manuals for division commanders, even when on the defensive 
the Japanese persisted in desperately seeking an opportunity to “deliver the enemy a decisive 
blow by attacking.”178 In contrast, though despised for their cowardice by the Japanese, Soviet 
forces were far more willing to retreat and reorganize (often under the cover of artillery), 
preserving both officer and front-line strength in the process. This fact, combined with the 
generally larger numbers of soldiers deployed in individual offensives on the Soviet side at both 
Nomonhan and Changkufeng, meant that the Red Army had a decisive advantage in troop 
strength – even if there was any truth to the Japanese claims of martial superiority. 
In short, the Imperial Japanese Army was still fixated on facing its opponent from more 
than thirty years before, those Russians who had defen d Port Arthur and fallen to the ‘human 
bullet’ tactics of the Japanese and who showed themselves inferior, man for man, to the Meiji 
conscripts. The enemy of 1905, however, was not the same as the modern Red Army, equipped 
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with masses of tanks, trucks, and artillery, and led by commanders such as Georgi Zhukov who 
were willing to pay the price in blood necessary to overcome the IJA’s do-or-die tactics. Though 
this change was apparent to some keen Japanese intellige ce and command officers, a culture of 
continuous underestimation of the enemy was developed in place of any serious self-reflection or 
military evaluation of the Korea Army or Kwantung Army’s unit structure, antitank/antiaircraft 
weaponry, or artillery fire support capabilities, all of which proved to be decisive weaknesses in 
its tactical operations on the battlefields of northeastern China. As early as 1938, it should have 
been apparent that in spite of official insistence that these deficiencies could be overcome by the 
men on the battlefield solely “because [they] were Japanese soldiers,” the IJA was unable to  
defeat a large, modern army in even a limited war without making serious changes. The refusal 
to accept this lesson would persist until it became  moot point in 1945. 
Epilogue: Another “August Storm” 
 The battles of 1938-39 were not the last conflicts between the Soviets and the Japanese. 
Though overshadowed by the American deployment of the a omic bomb, the Soviet invasion of 
Manchuria in August of 1945 demonstrated decisively how little had changed in the tactical 
doctrine of the IJA, even after more than half a deca  of battle against modern armies. By 1945 
the Kwantung Army was a shadow of its former self: due to concerns on the Pacific fronts in 
1944-1945, sixteen divisions had been transferred from Manchuria in little over a year, a major 
bleeding of strength.179 In mid-September of 1944, the Imperial General Headqu rters officially 
changed the status of the Kwantung Army from an offensive force – the status it had held since 
its creation – to a defensive one.180 On the eve of the attack, Soviet intelligence estima ed that the 
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Kwantung Army was now made up of only slightly more than a million men: 993,000 Japanese 
and 214,000 auxiliary (Manchukuoan) forces. Furthermore, of these men, the majority lacked 
quality. The units that had been transferred out were the veteran soldiers, and the remaining 
forces were made up largely of reservists, draftees, and the remnants of smaller units that had 
been merged together.181 This was not the bold Kwantung Army of the past operations, and it 
was little prepared to resist the ‘Soviet bear’ crashing down from the north. 
 To make matters worse, much of the materiel strengh of the Kwantung Army was 
depleted. For over one million men, they had only 1,155 tanks, 5,360 gun and artillery pieces, 
and 1,800 aircraft. These few resources were also poorly distributed to face an invasion. Most 
divisions still lacked artillery and antitank weapons in any numbers, both essential tools in 
repelling the heavily armored Soviet forces. The Kwantung Army units came up short by the 
standards of military technology just as they had before, despite continuous efforts at innovation. 
Their newest tanks, armed with only 57mm cannons and machine guns, were no match for the 
Soviet T-34 battle tanks, which not only had larger w aponry but also heavier armor, capable of 
withstanding multiple hits. Furthermore, all divisions lacked essential supplies and equipment for 
maintaining both the infantry and armored forces. In 1945, Imperial Army Headquarters did not 
consider a single Kwantung Army unit to be “combat ready”, and some divisions were at as little 
as fifteen percent of acceptable levels.182 
 By contrast, Soviet forces were in an excellent position on the eve of the attack. A Far 
East Command was specifically created under the command of Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky to 
handle the Manchurian invasion, and three front headqu rters were assigned to it. The combined 
armed strength of the Far East command included 1,058,982 men on front line duty and 518,743 
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rear service forces for a total of 1,577,725 operation l troops. These forces were supported by 
5,556 Soviet tanks, 3,721 aircraft, and more than 85,000 light vehicles. Combined, they made an 
offensive front 5,130 kilometers long aimed at the heart of Japanese-occupied Manchuria.183 
Furthermore, unlike the relatively ragtag troops that t e Kwantung Army was forced to rely on, 
many of these Soviet infantrymen were veterans of the war with Germany. The 39th Army and 
5th Army, for example, were assigned to fight in the most fortified areas of Manchuria, because 
of their previous success in combat in Germany's fortified Königsberg area. As another example, 
in the Grand Khingan Mountains region of western Manchuria, the Soviet 53rd Army and 6th 
Guards Tank Army were deployed after their experiences in the Carpathian Mountains.184 The 
Soviet forces were not only substantially better equipped and armed than their Kwantung Army 
counterparts, but most were also veterans of serious c mbat on similar terrain. Additionally, by 
1945 the Soviet Union had fully completed the restructuring of its armed forces after its 
weakness to 'blitzkrieg' attacks had been demonstrated, nd “nowhere was this more evident than 
in Manchuria.”185 The new forces were designed as combined arms regiments, meaning that they 
often included infantry, artillery, armored, and anti-aircraft forces all at once. In short, it was not
a question of whether or not the Soviets would be victorious, but of how quickly they could 
succeed and how far they could drive.186 
 On August 9 this storm finally rolled into Manchuria, encountering an unprepared 
Kwantung Army. The attack, launched under the “influence of a strong rain,” came as a complete 
surprise to the units who immediately received it.187 In addition to their previously discussed 
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military inferiority, the Japanese forces in Manchuria also suffered from severe tactical 
intelligence problems, tied to their chronic underestimation of the enemy. Although the Japanese 
Imperial Headquarters managed to correctly predict that the Soviet Union would be prepared to 
enter the war against Japan in August of 1945, this was not assigned particular significance. They 
did not anticipate that an attack would be launched immediately, banking on the terms of the 
Neutrality Pact, which had been cancelled in April but was still within a one year “grace period” 
lasting until 1946.188 Japanese intelligence used the extremely unreliabl method of counting 
train cars moving through cities with Japanese consulates to estimate the amount of troops that 
were being moved to the Manchurian front. Even as clo e to the attack as August 3, an official 
analysis by the Imperial General Headquarters Army Department was still relying on this method 
to predict Soviet operational readiness, and the report indicated that only 40-50 Soviet divisions 
were in place at the time of the attack, compared to the 55 to 60 believed necessary for an 
invasion.189 Presented with this information after the war's end, a Soviet general merely 
snickered – there had been 80 divisions in place at the time of the invasion.190 Russian 
intelligence had also made mistakes, but on the side of overestimation: the mass of artillery and 
manpower they deployed was more than necessary to cush the Kwantung Army.191 As Edward 
Drea summarily phrased it, “the Japanese were unprepared strategically, operationally, or 
tactically for the massive Soviet blow that fell on August 9, 1945.”192 
 Soviet forces swept through Manchuria in the first days of the attack, effectively 
deploying their new tactics. In the north, Japanese colonists found themselves defenseless as the 
                                                
188 Drea, “Missing Intentions,” 68. 
189   Imperial General Headquarters Army Department, “Beieisosantōkaidan, eikokusenkyokyuusonotainichi 
sensōjyunbishinchokutōnibanfujōseikansatsubeieichoukeitainichkyōdōseimeinisekisurukansatsu,” August 3, 1945 
(JACAR A03032243200), 11. 
190 Drea, “Missing Intentions,” 69. 
191  Nakayama, Kantōgun, 247-248. 
192 Drea, “Missing Intentions,” 70. 
   
62 
Kwantung Army rapidly retreated to its most fortified areas. Although 2,761 deaths are reported 
as having occurred in battle, 4,395 evacuating colonists chose to commit suicide rather than 
struggle through what seemed like impossible conditions, and an additional 1,894 committed 
suicide in battle. Only sixty-three percent of settlers would ever return to Japan.193 Military units 
fared no better despite a quick retreat from the border areas. Without accurate intelligence 
available, Japanese units consistently found themselves surrounded by the fast-moving Soviet 
offensive, and their planned defensive points were oft n overrun before they could even be 
occupied. Within a week, “the Soviets had accomplished all their major objectives and destroyed 
the Kwantung Army.” This was not due to the Japanese being demoralized at the time of the 
attack; rather, the defenders “fanatically resisted” he Soviets, fighting “savagely” against 
overwhelming odds, just as had many civilian settlers.194 Their efforts meant little in the face of 
significant Soviet advantages, and they were swept away by the force of the ‘August Storm.’ 
In the space of six years of continuous war since the conclusion of Nomonhan, the Imperial 
Japanese Army had consistently failed to innovate in its tactics, always relying on faith and self-
delusion to overcome to growing might of their enemies. Regardless of the unmistakable folly of 
their greater strategy, this element alone goes far in explaining how this once seemingly 
invincible force was crushed, again and again, by the eternally adapting nature of war. Any army 
facing a changing battlefield would do well to heed those lessons which were left unlearned on 
the hills near Changkufeng and the steppes of Nomonhan. 
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